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Introduction 
 
 
Russian President Vladimir Putin has been typically depicted as an obstinate player in 
international politics. Especially since the internal crisis in Ukraine erupted in November of 
2013, which was followed by the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, President Putin himself 
has been accused multiple times by Ukraine, the West, several western international 
organizations and the western media of not caring about international law and treaties that 
have been signed for the protection of human rights and territorial integrity (Alter 2014). 
According to the Ukrainian delegation in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe 
for example,  “Russia believes that it is not bound by the judgements of international judicial 
bodies and that it can rob, kill, displace, kidnap and destroy with complete impunity.”1 Even 
though this depiction of President Putin being obstinate existed before the conflict in Ukraine, 
it appears that the accusations of President Putin flouting international agreements increased 
enormously since the annexation of Crimea.  This thesis will analyze whether this depiction of 
Putin’s attitude towards international agreements, which is reflected upon the Russian state as 
a whole is correct, or whether Russia appears to be less obstinate than it has been depicted by 
Ukraine and the West, in handling the conflict in Ukraine when working within an international 
organization.  
 In order to be able to analyze this, it is of course necessary to first understand the 
conflict in Ukraine. The conflict will be introduced shortly here, but will be further elaborated in 
chapter three. The conflict in Ukraine started with the internal crisis in Ukraine, which erupted 
in November 2013, when former Ukrainian President Yanukovych announced that the signing 
of the Association Agreement with the European Union, which would boost cooperation 
between Ukraine and Europe, was going to be postponed (Al Jazeera 2013; Haukkala 2015, 33 – 
34; Karagiannis 2016, 139). This decision led to huge demonstrations of pro-European citizens 
to demonstrate in the Maidan Square in Ukraine’s capital city Kiev against the pro-Russian 
                                                          
1 Appendix A, PACE AS 2015 CR 23. 
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Yanukovych. On February 23, 2014, after three months of demonstrations on Maidan square, 
President Yanukovych was toppled and fled to Russia to seek asylum there. The toppling of the 
pro-Russian president caused a political vacuum which led to even more tensions in Ukraine, 
especially in the regions in the south and east of Ukraine (German & Karagiannis 2016, 2).   
First of all, unrest was sparked in Crimea when pro-Russian separatists organized a 
referendum for the self-determination of Crimea, which resulted in an overwhelming majority 
of votes for the incorporation of Crimea into the Russian Federation. The referendum was 
rejected as rigged by the West. Whether the outcome of the referendum was illegitimate or 
not, the Crimean peninsula was swiftly annexed by so-called ‘little green men’ only two days 
after the referendum and incorporated into the Russian Federation (Karagiannis 2016, 139). 
When Russia annexed Crimea, the internal crisis in Ukraine evolved in an international conflict, 
for which Russia was mostly blamed. Also in the eastern regions of Ukraine, Luhansk and 
Donetsk, pro-Russian separatists who, according to the West, were supported materially by 
Russia revolted against the pro-European interim government. Separatists in Donetsk occupied 
government buildings and called for a referendum on unification with Russia, and later in 
Luhansk the same course of events took place (BBC 2014c). As a reaction to the declarations of 
independence of both Luhansk and Donetsk, the Ukrainian military was sent to these regions to 
perform an anti-terrorist operation against the pro-Russian separatists (Marcus 2014). The anti-
terrorist operation is in line with the Ukrainian government’s official view on the conflict, 
namely that the pro-Russian separatists are terrorists who are supported by the Russian 
government.2 The conflict has many controversies in terms of conflicting views on the course of 
events of the conflict from Russia, Ukraine and the West. These will be elaborated on in the 
third chapter of this thesis. 
The Russian government, similarly to its statements on the annexation of Crimea, denies 
any Russian military presence in the east of Ukraine (Demirjian 2015). On the fifth of September 
2014, the Minsk Protocol, also known as Minsk I, was signed by Ukraine, Russia and the two 
non-recognized People’s Republics of Donetsk and Luhansk and the Special Representative 
from the Trilateral Contact Group of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
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(OSCE). The agreement  was supposed to ensure a ceasefire between the conflicting parties, 
but both Russia and Ukraine breached the agreement. In February of 2015 a second agreement, 
Minsk II, was signed. However, within just three days the second ceasefire agreement was 
violated (EPRS 2016).  
 Not only do the West and Ukraine accuse President Putin of violating a number of 
international agreements, treaties, conventions and laws, but when taking a closer look at the 
conflict it appears that President Putin has a very different approach to what the course of 
events in Ukraine have been since the eruption of the conflict and the subsequent 
developments in the country. The Russian government official statements and President Putin 
himself deny any military presence and the illegal annexation and occupation of Crimea and do 
not appear to be changing this rhetoric anytime soon. Thus it does not appear incorrect to state 
that President Putin has an obstinate attitude towards the conflict in Ukraine. On top of that, it 
appears that President Putin lacks respect for the norms and values of the international 
community, which do respect and protect human rights and territorial integrity. This is 
particularly interesting when realizing that the Russian Federation did adopt a large number of 
conventions, treaties and other agreements in order to protect exactly these norms and values 
with its accession to international organizations such as the Council of Europe and the OSCE.  
The fact that President Putin denies all accusations in public, does not necessarily mean 
that his delegations to the international organizations do so as well. This thesis will therefore 
research the following question: Have the Russian delegations to the Council of Europe and the 
OSCE been socialized and have they thus internalized the norms and values of these 
organizations into their self-identification? The answer to this question will help us better 
understand the negotiations for the resolution of the conflict in Ukraine, and the potential 
options for the eventual conflict resolution as well. Even though Putin’s lack of identification 
and respect for the shared identity of the West was discussed before the conflict in Ukraine 
started, the accusations towards Russia and President Putin very much increased since the 
beginning of the conflict in Ukraine. This is why the analysis in this thesis will be based on the 
period of 2014 to 2016 and will only focus on Russian statements concerning the conflict in 
Ukraine.  
  S1627511 
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In order to answer the research question, chapter one “Theoretical Framework: 
Socialization in International Organizations” sets out the theoretical framework for the analysis. 
The analysis is based on the theory of socialization in international relations, which is the IR-
theory that analyzes the degree of a states’ internalization of the norms and values of 
international organizations and thus the states’ identification with the community of which it is 
a member and which it supposedly identifies with (Schimmelfennig 2000, 112; Checkel 2005, 
804). If the Russian delegations in the OSCE and the Council of Europe appear to be very much 
socialized, then despite President Putin’s obstinate statements and negation of any 
involvement in the conflict in public, Russia does attempt to work towards a fair political 
resolution to the conflict in order to uphold human rights and international laws. If Russian 
delegates do not appear to have internalized the shared norms and values of these 
organizations, a resolution for the conflict will be very hard to find because that would mean 
that Russia might indeed not care about the conventions and other agreements it has signed in 
the past.  
As a background before conducting the analysis, chapter two, “Socialization in 
International Organizations: the Council of Europe and the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe” will introduce the organizations that are being used as a subject for the 
analysis; the Council of Europe and the OSCE. This chapter elaborates on the formation of these 
organizations, what their shared norms and values exactly are, how the Russian Federation 
joined them and what their relations with Russia have been since its accession. Finally, chapter 
two will also discuss the role of both the Council of Europe and the OSCE in the conflict in 
Ukraine.  
The third chapter, “Russian Ukraine Policy and Conflicting Views on the Ukrainian 
Conflict,” explains Russian Ukraine Policy and Russian relations with and interests in Ukraine. 
These are important to put the conflict in the correct context and gain a better understanding 
of the roots of the conflict. Also, it will compare the Western, Ukrainian and Russian official 
views on the conflict in Ukraine.  
 Finally, chapter four, “Analysis of the Statements of the Russian Delegation in the Council of 
Europe” and chapter five, “Analysis of the Statements of the Russian Delegation in the OSCE” 
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will conduct the actual analysis and assess whether the Russian delegations to the Council of 
Europe and the OSCE have internalized the shared norms and values of these organizations. 
These chapters will also compare the statements of the Russian delegation in the two 
organizations and analyze whether there might be a difference in the degree of socialization of 
Russia between the two organizations. The hypothesis is that the Russian delegations did not 
truly internalize the shared norms and values of neither the Council of Europe, nor the OSCE 
but engages in so-called conscious role play, meaning that Russia has learned what the norms 
and values of the organizations are and act in accordance with these norms and values, in order 
to gain international legitimacy due to its participation in these international organizations. This 
degree of internalization is defined as Type I socialization.  
 My method to find out the degree of socialization of the Russian delegation is to find 
relevant statements in various sessions held by both the OSCE and the Council of Europe. There 
is a vast amount of documents available for both organizations, thus it was necessary to narrow 
the search to one topic, namely the conflict in Ukraine. Both the OSCE and the Council of 
Europe have had meetings that were specifically organized to debate the conflict in Ukraine. 
The statements from the Russian delegations to the Council of Europe and the OSCE that are 
going to be analyzed in the last two chapters of this thesis come from these specific meetings. 
The statements were mostly collected in October and November of 2016, and since new 
statements in the OSCE are published on a weekly basis, this thesis will only analyze the 
statements from 2014 and 2015, with several statements from 2016 in order to be certain that 
the rhetoric of the Russian delegation did not drastically change after 2015.   
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Chapter 1 
Theoretical Framework: Socialization in International Organizations 
 
1.1 Introduction 
The theoretical framework for the analysis of this thesis is the theory of socialization in 
the international community, in particular in international organizations. This chapter will focus 
on explaining socialization theory and elaborate on the use of the theory in the international 
community and its relevance for this research. This chapter will first elaborate on the theory of 
socialization and cover the most prominent authors and articles in the field. Then, it will link the 
theory to international relations. Thirdly, this chapter will clarify why it is important to analyze 
actors in international organizations through the lens of socialization and introduce some of the 
research that has been conducted on socialization in international organizations as starting 
point for this thesis.  
In order to understand the theory of socialization, it is important to define socialization 
first. While reading the literature on socialization it appears that there are several definitions 
which, while varying in some aspects, have one core theme in common: socialization is a 
process in which actors incorporate in one’s self the beliefs, norms, values and/or rules of a 
community (Schimmelfennig 2000, 112; Johnston 2001, 494; Checkel 2005, 804; Hooghe 2005, 
865). The actors in this thesis will be the Russian state in the form of its delegates in the given 
international organizations, and the international organizations are the community in the 
definition of socialization. The incorporation of a community’s norms, beliefs or values by an 
actor is defined as internalization in the literature, which is explained as “(…) the adoption of 
social beliefs and practices into the actor’s own repertoire of cognitions and behaviors”, or 
“self-identification” (Schimmelfennig 2000, 112; Checkel 2005, 804). The more an actor has 
internalized the beliefs or norms and thus identifies itself with these, the more socialized the 
actor is. 
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As Schimmelfennig explains, socialization is completed when the actor has internalized 
certain beliefs from the community and truly views them as its own beliefs as well 
(Schimmelfennig 2000, 112). In the literature the terms socialization and internalization are 
sometimes used as synonyms. For the purpose of this thesis, internalization will be used to 
describe the most important part of the process of socialization, namely the acceptance of 
certain norms and values into the self-identification of the actor. Socialization in this thesis will 
be defined as the result of internalization, which shows whether an actor has socialized or not. 
Of course there are various degrees of internalization and thus of socialization. Alastair 
Johnston’s argument for the various degrees of internalization is that different actors come into 
a community with different backgrounds and identifications and consequently react to social 
pressures in a different manner (Johnston 2001, 495). One could argue that the outcome of 
socialization depends on the degree of internalization of the norms and values of the 
community by the actor and thus to what extent the actor identifies him- or herself with the 
community’s norms.  
 
1.2 Theoretical Framework 
1.2.1 Socialization Theory 
There are many concepts involved in socialization theory. This section will explain the most 
crucial concepts for understanding the theory. First of all, in order to be able to analyze 
whether an actor is in the process of socialization, it is necessary to take a step back and 
understand which norms and values are involved in the process. Of course, before one can 
argue that an actor has internalized certain values, it is crucial to come to an understanding of 
the beliefs, rules or values that are accepted as the norm in a community. This set of values is 
called a ‘common lifeworld’, which is as Thomas Risse writes: “a supply of collective 
interpretations of the world and of themselves [e.g. the community], as provided by language, 
a common history or culture. The common lifeworld consists of a shared culture and a common 
system of norms and rules perceived as legitimate” (Risse 1999, 534). Without a common 
lifeworld, out of norm behavior would have no consequences, thus no rewards (‘carrots’) or 
punishments (‘sticks’) (Johnston 2001, 501-502). It would also be impossible to analyze whether 
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an actor is in the process of socialization. The common lifeworld is also one of the elements 
that attracts an actor to create, engage with or enter into a certain community. 
Once the actor has entered into a certain community due to either the benefits that the 
community offers and/or the rules and values of the community that the actor appreciates, the 
actor begins the socialization process. As this chapter will elaborate on later, this can be a 
process that has begun even before entering into the community. Jeffrey Checkel brings in two 
important concepts when elaborating on internalization and socialization. He explains that 
when a new actor enters a certain community and begins the socialization process, the actor 
switches from a “logic of consequences” to a “logic of appropriateness” (Checkel 2005, 804). 
The first, the logic of consequences, can be explained as the actor’s rational behavior that is 
independent of the common lifeworld of the community. The actor acts according to what he 
believes to be suitable in order to obtain the benefits from being a part of the community, and 
not get sanctioned. An actor has switched to the logic of appropriateness on the other hand, 
once he begins to internalize the values of the community, and thus his self-identification 
changes, which eventually means that the actor will behave according to the norms and values 
of the community because he identifies himself with those and believes them to be socially 
accepted.  
Of course, we cannot simply state that when an actor appears to follow the logic of 
appropriateness, the process of socialization has been effective or successful. On the contrary, 
Checkel warns that an actor could very well engage in conscious roleplaying, learning what the 
common lifeworld of the community consists of and acting by it, without acknowledging them 
as the right set of norms and values (Checkel 2005, 804). When an actor adopts this new role in 
the form of conscious roleplaying, we are talking about Type I socialization (Checkel 2005, 804). 
An actor who has switched to the logic of appropriateness could of course also have truly 
accepted the norms and values of the community and integrated them in their own 
identification instead of engaging in conscious roleplay. In this case, the actor can be defined as 
being socialized or having internalized the norms and values of the community. In the 
literature, this is also defined as the ‘taken-for-grantedness’ of the new values, and is 
considered as Type II socialization (Checkel 2005, 804; Johnston 2001, 495). 
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According to Axelrod, there are a number of aspects within the community that can lead 
to “pro-norm behavior” by the actor: identification, authority, social proof and voluntary 
membership (Axelrod 1997, 58-59). When the actor considers the common lifeworld of the 
community to be legitimate (authority), has incorporated it in his identification, and has 
entered the community voluntarily, the actor will be more prone to act accordingly. However, 
every actor in an international community maintains his own, domestic interests besides the 
collective interest of the community as well. This could of course influence the actor’s behavior 
in any given community (Adler & Barnett 1998a, 32). As realists argue for example, the state 
will always act in order to maximize its own benefits. Keeping this in mind, actors in 
international communities could have many reasons to engage in Type I socialization. It is a 
difficult task to discover whether an actor can be placed within Type I or Type II socialization, 
because an actor will never announce that he does not truly identify with the common lifeworld 
of the community. One way of deciding that an actor can be placed within Type I socialization, 
is when the actor is being accused of behavior that clashes with the common lifeworld of the 
community, because when entering into the community the actor has agreed to these norms 
(Risse 1999, 573). When an actor shows out of norm behavior after being a long-time member 
of the community, the behavior might simply be a change in strategy in order to serve the 
actor’s own interests.  Johnston states that it in order to be able to analyze the behavior of an 
actor it is necessary to create a set of fixed interests of the actor (Johnston 2001, 491-492). This 
way, it becomes possible to discriminate conscious role-playing from other behaviors that 
might be displayed. 
 
1.2.2 Socialization in International Relations 
Socialization in international relations can be explained as the “society of states” (Bull 1977, 
13). Bull’s idea of the society of states fits perfectly into the theory of socialization, since it is 
defined as a group of states that work together due to common values and interests (Bull 1977, 
13-14). If we look at the international political arena as such, then it appears to be logical to 
assume certain behavioral patterns such as socialization of states in international relations. 
Socialization in international relations is very much undertheorized though, according to 
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Johnston. This is remarkable, since as he puts it, “the goal of diplomacy is often the socialization 
of others to accept in an axiomatic way novel understandings about world politics” (Johnston 
2001, 489). On top of that, Kenneth Waltz explains that socialization in international relations is 
inevitable, since it simply is the result of a state’s “involvement in the system” (Waltz 1979, 
128). In order to be able to gain the benefits of the international society of states, the individual 
state – the actor - will have to adapt to the common lifeworld of the organization or institution 
from which it can obtain the benefits. Due to international cooperation and collaboration, it is 
inevitable that states have to join international organizations in order to be able to gain any 
benefits in the international community.  
It is clear that one of the main aspects of socialization theory is the gaining of benefits 
from a community. In international relations these communities can be divided into a variety of 
international institutions, organizations, and military alliances for example, since there are 
many reasons for cooperation on the international level. One of these reasons, and possibly the 
most important one, is building mutual trust which in theory will eventually lead to mutual 
security (Deutsch 1970, 36-38). Mutual security in this sense could be any kind of security, 
ranging from secure economic ties to military cooperation, domestic security and even 
humanitarian security. Many international relations theories, such as (neo) realist, (neo) liberal, 
and constructivist theories, consider the international community of states as an anarchy 
without any overarching power. This idea, together with the notion that actors in the 
international environment will always maintain their domestic interests besides the shared 
interests of the community, creates the idea that mutual trust would be very hard to build. 
Through a cooperation such as in international organizations though, states are able to check 
each other’s behavior (Adler & Barnett 1998a, 50; Johnston 2001, 507). This can eventually lead 
to the building of some sense of mutual trust between member states, which will in turn lead to 
mutual identification and the creation of a less hostile international environment (Adler & 
Barnett 1998a, 45-46). 
Another important reason for international cooperation is the legitimization of the 
individual states. With the rapid globalization, states have to strengthen their international 
relations so that they will not be left out in international agreements. For instance, when a 
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group of actors considers an actor to be legitimate, they will trust that actor to be able to 
decide on mutual security matters as well. Before the others in the international community 
will consider an actor as legitimate though, the actor will have to show that his behavior 
corresponds to their common lifeworld (Schimmelfennig 2000, 116). As explained before, this 
does not necessarily mean that the actor has internalized the common lifeworld, but it could 
also simply be that the actor is living up to the norms and values of the community in order to 
gain legitimacy. Whether an actor has or has not internalized the common lifeworld of the 
community is a matter of perception for the other actors in the community. Once the new actor 
is perceived as ‘one of us’ by the other actors, they will grant the actor legitimacy. Of course 
there are limits to an actor’s conscious roleplaying in Type I socialization. As soon as an actor 
consistently clashes with the common lifeworld of the community he loses his credibility 
(Schimmelfennig 2000, 119). Credibility and the legitimacy that comes with it are necessary 
assets to gain in order to be able to serve the individual agenda of the actor. One is to gain, 
besides legitimacy itself, status within the international community. According to Johnston, 
status can be a mechanism to get other actors to want to work with the actor who has status 
(Johnston 2001, 501). Finally, the actor who is perceived as legitimate and trustworthy will 
automatically be more credible in negotiations on certain international decisions (Johnston 
2001, 498; Risse 1999, 536). This will eventually result in an easier path for such an actor to 
achieve his domestic interests. It is thus important for an actor who engages in Type I 
socialization to do so in a convincing manner, or else he will not be granted trust and legitimacy 
necessary to receive the benefits of the community. 
 
1.3 Socialization Theory in Practice 
1.3.1 Socialization in International Organizations 
As argued before, the international community can be explained as a society of states. When 
looking at international institutions, we focus on smaller components of the international 
community. These smaller components can be regarded as social environments as well 
according to Checkel (Checkel 2005, 815). The same can be argued for international 
organizations, which can be regarded as a kind of normative social environments where states 
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become socialized when participating in them. Besides the fact that international organizations 
can be considered as an instrument to check other actors, they can be a place where actors can 
become familiar with different perceptions of global and security issues as well. Within an 
international organization, actors come face to face with each other and are bound to discuss 
their issues. 
The issues that are brought up for discussion by actors in a particular organization are 
mostly connected to the mission of that organization. Since in most international organizations 
there is no common language or common history amongst all actors, these factors that typically 
produce the common lifeworld have to be replaced by something else that connects the actors. 
As stated before, an important reason for establishing an organization is the building of mutual 
trust. Without mutual trust, the international community would be less stable. The mission of 
an international organization, thus the collective cause of the participating states, can also be 
the binding factor which can, at least to a certain extent, substitute for the common lifeworld. 
For instance, Risse argues that the global human rights regime by itself creates a framework in 
which certain (argumentative) behavior is accepted due to the shared principles within the 
organizations. On the other hand, Risse writes that “the principle of noninterference in internal 
affairs constitutes a powerful counter norm that serves as a reference point for governments 
not to implement the norms domestically” (Risse 1999, 573). 
This argument brings us back to Type I socialized states in international organizations. 
An actor is sanctioned whenever he violates the norms of the international organization and 
thus does not act in line with the mission of that organization. Important international 
organizations, of which powerful states such as the United States of America are members, can 
pressure the norm violating state greatly into living up to the norms and rules of the 
organization. The result is not limited to sanctions that create an inequality between pro norm 
and norm violating actors within the organization. Powerful actors can also decide on economic 
sanctions and treat the norm violating state as “an international pariah, (…) an outsider to the 
community of civilized nations” (Risse 1999, 542). According to Johnston, fear of shaming is a 
driver behind conformity (Johnston 2001, 502). The goal is thus to pressure the state into 
eventually internalizing the common lifeworld of the organization. 
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The most obvious examples of powerful states pressuring other states to internalize a 
set of norms and values are from the 1990’s to early 2000’s, when the Central and Eastern 
European states and other former Soviet republics entered into a variety of international 
organizations. These states are also known as the ‘new Europe’ (Schimmelfennig 2000, 109-
110). After the fall of the Soviet Union, these newly emerged states were left without 
membership in any organization, had a communist past and were in great need of foreign aid. 
Several organizations, such as the European Union, the Council of Europe and the OSCE, 
welcomed the former Soviet republics to join them and initiated their socialization process. For 
some states though, membership was only granted after they showed that they were able to 
live up to the norms and values of these organizations. 
 
1.3.2 Existing Research on Socialization in International Organizations  
Before analyzing the socialization in the Council of Europe and the OSCE, this paragraph will 
look into the existing research on socialization in other international organizations. 
International organizations are very likely places for socialization due to their ability to build 
trust between states in an anarchic international community. According to Adler and Barnett: 
“Organizations […] are sites of socialization and learning, places where political actors learn and 
perhaps even teach others what their interpretations of the situation and normative 
understandings are. Because identities are created and reproduced on the basis of knowledge 
that people have of themselves and others, learning processes that occur within and are 
promoted by institutions can lead actors to develop positive reciprocal expectations and thus 
identify with each other” (Adler & Barnett 1998a, 43). Unfortunately, despite their ability to 
build trust and create mutual identification, which could potentially decrease issues within the 
international community, socialization in international relations has been undertheorized. This 
means that existing literature on socialization in international organizations is quite limited.  
One of the most important analyses that have been conducted on socialization in 
international organizations is Hooghe’s research on socialization in the European Commission. 
Hooghe performed an analysis based on a combination of previously conducted research on 
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socialization and the existing theories and concepts. According to Hooghe, the European 
Commission is a very likely place for socialization because of its autonomy in the international 
community (Hooghe 2005, 862). For her research, Hooghe examines individuals in the 
organization though, since employees of the European Commission are delegates of a certain 
state but work specifically for the Commission. Even though my method will be not to talk to 
individuals in the Russian delegations, but to look at the delegation as a whole as a proxy, 
Hooghe’s analysis brings a number of relevant observations. The first is that the time period of 
an official’s engagement with the organization plays an important role in the degree of 
socialization of this particular individual (Hooghe 2005, 866). This person enters the 
organization not only with certain ideas, but also with a set of norms and values from his or her 
own culture (Hooghe 2005, 869).  Secondly, the less experienced an official is, the more swiftly 
he will socialize but only in a limited organization. The less confined the organization is, the less 
prone the actors will be to socialization. Hooghe’s third observation is that large issues enhance 
socialization. And finally, which goes against the expectations of socialization theory, self-
selected actors are not necessarily more prone to accept the common lifeworld of the 
organization (Hooghe 2005, 887).  
In both the Council of Europe and the OSCE, the delegates in the multiple bodies of the 
organizations are representatives of a state’s government who only come together for summits 
and other meetings. They therefore do not only work for the Council or the OSCE, but work for 
the state’s government first and then for the organizations. Nevertheless, the above mentioned 
observations are relevant to the analysis of the Council of Europe and the OSCE as well. 
According to Hooghe, individuals who work for a state’s government “have been socialized to 
place the highest value on public service to their nation” (Hooghe 2005, 869). If this is the case, 
we can assume that delegates from the various governments in the Council and the OSCE are 
less socialized towards the common lifeworlds of the organizations than officials of the 
European Commission. On the other hand, even though self-selected officials of the European 
Commission are not necessarily more prone to socialization, states that join an organization on 
their own request might be depending on the benefits that the organization can offer and the 
rules it has to adapt to. On top of that, both the Council of Europe and the OSCE are focused on 
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security issues which are perceived as extremely important to the actors. The conflict in 
Ukraine at this moment is a large issue, which might thus lead to increased socialization of the 
Russian delegation.  
 
1.4 Conclusion 
Even though socialization in international relations is undertheorized, it can be very helpful to 
analyze the statements of the Russian delegates in the OSCE and the Council of Europe through 
the lens of socialization theory. Since the goal of diplomacy mostly is the socialization of other 
states, it is an inevitable result of involvement in the international system. In order to be able to 
analyze socialization in international organizations it is important to first uncover what the 
common lifeworld consists of. As Risse argued, in the case of an international organization this 
might very well be its mission. In the next chapter the Council of Europe and the OSCE will be 
introduced and it will become clear what their missions, and hence potentially their common 
lifeworlds, are.  
Socialization will play a very important role in the analysis of the primary sources from 
the OSCE and the Council of Europe. The statements of the Russian delegates on the conflict in 
Ukraine in both organizations will show us whether Russian delegations have internalized the 
norms and values of the OSCE and the Council. Even though it is fairly logical that a state 
maintains its own national interests besides the shared interests within the organization, one 
important hurdle that this thesis will have to overcome is that it could very well be possible that 
the Russian delegations in the organizations can be classified as a Type I socialized state. In 
order to be able to decide on the degree of socialization of the Russian delegation, chapter 
three will create a framework of Russian fixed interests in Ukraine before analyzing the 
statements in both organizations. This will be done by outlining Russia’s Ukraine policy. 
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Chapter 2 
Socialization in International Organizations: the Council of Europe and the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Along the lines of the previous chapter, this chapter will introduce the Council of Europe and 
the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the two international 
organizations that this thesis focuses on in order to understand their common lifeworlds and be 
able to analyze the degree of socialization of the Russian state within these organizations. The 
hypothesis is that both the Council of Europe and the OSCE are likely places for socialization.  
The reason to believe that both organizations are a likely place for socialization is 
threefold. First of all, membership of both organizations works through self-selection. States 
are not invited to join, but choose themselves to belong to a certain organization and are thus 
in some way attracted to the norms and values of the organization or the benefits that the 
organization has to offer. Second, the legitimacy that the organizations can bring to a member 
state, including the Russian state, might spark its self-interest and thus can trigger socialization 
as well (Hooghe 2005, 869). On top of that, Adler and Barnett suggest that after integration has 
been reached, the time period during which a state has been integrated matters to the 
consolidation of this integration (Adler & Barnett 1998a, 35). This is why it is interesting to take 
a look at both the Council of Europe, of which Russia became a member state in 1996, and at 
the OSCE, of which Russia (as the former Soviet Union) was one of the organizing states in 
1973, and see whether there is a difference in the degree of socialization between both 
organizations. Finally, and possibly most importantly, due to the fact that both the OSCE and 
the Council of Europe do not have mechanisms in place to enforce norms and rules, 
socialization is their only option to reform the participating or member states. In practice, these 
organizations thus function as the so—called teachers of the common lifeworld of the social 
environment that is created by the organizations themselves.  
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 In order to correctly describe and analyze both organizations it is necessary to 
understand the concept of security communities first. To begin with, even though the OSCE has 
‘security’ embedded in its title and the Council of Europe does not, this thesis will treat both of 
them as both international organizations as well as security communities. Normally when 
talking about security, terms such as the military and war come to mind. This thesis will, as the 
OSCE and the Council do themselves as well, depict a picture of security that is broader than 
the conventional view of war and military. Karl Deutsch was the first scholar to formulate a 
definition for a security community, which was a community in which the integration of its 
members has assured “that the members of that community will not fight each other 
physically, but will settle their disputes in some other way” (Deutsch 1957, 5). This implies that 
in a security community organization there must be shared norms and values that constrain 
members of the community from settling anything by physical fighting. On top of these norms 
and values, there has to be some sort of cooperation that goes beyond the self-interest of a 
member to join the community, presumably the mission of the organization. In any community, 
member states will naturally maintain their own set of interests, but they have to restrain 
themselves from continuously pushing for their own agendas, since this will eventually lead to 
conflict (Jervis 1982, 357; Adler & Barnett 1998a, 32-35). Thus for the purposes of the analysis 
of socialization of the Russian state in the Council of Europe and the OSCE, both organizations 
are going to be treated in this thesis as communities that attempt to resolve issues via other 
channels than violence, such as political dialogue.  
 According to Adler and Barnett there are two types of communities; loosely-coupled 
and tightly-coupled (security) communities. Whereas members of a loosely-coupled community 
simply have “dependable expectations of peaceful change,” a tightly-coupled community 
settles disputes or attempts to prevent them through a set of arrangements and rules signed by 
all members (Adler & Barnett 1998a, 30).  Because of these rules and arrangements, all 
members will have to comply with them in order not to suffer any sanctions and thus miss out 
on any of the benefits. Adler and Barnett argue that the more tightly-coupled the community is, 
the more members will have to act according to the rules of the community internationally as 
well as domestically (Adler & Barnett 1998a, 36). The notion of a tightly-coupled type of 
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community fits well with the description of the Council of Europe whereas the OSCE appears to 
be more of a loosely-coupled community. As will be elaborated on later in this chapter, even 
though both organizations have been founded by the signing of a Convention or Final Act in 
order to join either of them, the Council of Europe appears to be stricter on making sure that all 
members abide by the rules. This chapter will now introduce both the Council of Europe and 
the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Finally it will elaborate on Russia’s 
role in both organizations.  
 
2.2 The Council of Europe 
The Council of Europe was founded in 1949, right after the Second World War. It was “created 
to unite Europe around the shared principles of the rule of law, respect for human rights and 
democracy” (Council of Europe as cited by Headley 2012, 428). In order to serve this goal, there 
are several important treaties and conventions that have been signed by all 47 member states. 
The most important one is the European Convention for Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (ECHR), which was first signed in 1950. Other important legally-binding documents of 
the Council are the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and the Framework 
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (Jordan 2003, 661). According to the 
Council itself, today it is “the continent’s leading human rights organization” (CoE 2017). The 
fundamental rights described in the ECHR and in the two important conventions can be 
considered to be the common lifeworld of the Council of Europe. Fundamental freedoms such 
as freedom of speech, freedom of press, freedom of equality and non-discrimination for 
example, are considered to be a large part of the common lifeworld of the Council of Europe, 
together with democratic principles such as the right to free and fair elections and the right to 
self-determination. Even though the Council relies on its mission of protecting human rights, 
rule of law and democracy within its member states, not all of them have effectively ratified all 
the conventions or consistently abided them.   
 The Council of Europe was one of the first international organizations that, already as 
early as 1990, began to admit Central and Eastern European states and former Soviet republics 
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as member states after the fall of the Soviet Union. The reasoning behind admitting newly 
emerging states and former communist republics was that, according to Jordan, existing 
member states preferred not to isolate these new players on the international political stage 
(Jordan 2003, 661-662). Normally when applying for membership of the Council of Europe, it is 
necessary to fulfil certain conditions, such as being loyal to the democratic values of the 
Council. However, when the Central and Eastern European states and the post-Soviet republics 
applied, most of them were admitted even before adopting the values of the Council and it 
soon became clear that not all of these members (especially Russia and Ukraine) would keep 
their promise of fulfilling these conditions after their accession (Schimmelfennig 2000, 128; 
130). Clearly, the existing Council members hoped that the new members would develop 
democratic values and certain norms while being a member state. However, due to domestic 
pressures or values not all Eurasian states have ratified the conventions in their totality, such as 
Russia.  
Similar to Johnston’s idea that the fear of shaming is a driver behind conformity to the 
community’s common lifeworld, Risse and Sikkink argue that due to the social aspect of 
organizations in which in-groups and out-groups are formed, states in the out-group will 
eventually adapt themselves. They state that this is due to the fact that it is more appealing to 
be part of the in-group (Risse & Sikkink 1999, 38). This would implicate that the analysis of the 
statements of the Russian delegates in the organizations will show that Russia attempts to 
abide by the organization’s rules in order to maintain or regain its place within the in-group and 
consequently gain the benefits of the organizations. A side note for the accession of the new 
members in the 1990s is that according to Schimmelfennig the Central and Eastern European 
states applied for membership of the Council in order to get closer to potential membership of 
the EU and NATO (Schimmelfennig 2000, 128-129). Logically, due to Russian troubling relations 
with NATO and its perception of NATO as threatening for Russian security, for Russia this was 
not one of its interests for accession.  
 The Council of Europe has several bodies, the Committee of Ministers, the Committee of 
Minister’s Deputies, the Parliamentary Assembly (PACE) and the Secretariat General of the 
Council of Europe. The PACE is the advisory body of the Council, has set up the ECHR, and 
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appoints judges to the European Court of Human Rights as well as the Commissioner for Human 
Rights. There are 648 representatives from national parliaments of the member states in the 
PACE. The PACE holds four meetings a year and can adopt recommendations, resolutions and 
opinions (CoE, a). 
 
2.2.1 The Russian Federation in the Council of Europe 
The Russian Federation applied for membership of the Council in 1992. The application was 
suspended for nine months in 1995 when Russia intervened in Chechnya, but reopened in 
September 1995. Russia’s accession was only accepted after it introduced a moratorium on the 
death penalty in 1996 (CoE, b). There were some doubts about the circumstances of human 
rights in Russia, about the application of the rule of law, the independence of judges and other 
fundamental values of the Council (Bindig 1996; Jordan 2003, 680). Also, even though Russia 
has always perceived itself as part of Europe, some members of the Council doubted whether 
Russia should be a member of the Council due to its different norms and values (Headley 2012, 
430). Nevertheless Mr. Bindig, a German rapporteur of the Council concluded that: “The 
question could, however, be asked whether the accession of the Russian Federation might in 
itself help to create conditions in conformity with Council of Europe standards, on the one hand 
through the commitments to be entered into by Russia upon accession and the subsequent 
monitoring procedure, and on the other hand, as a result of the mandatory judgments of the 
European Court of Human Rights. This consideration and other political arguments might speak 
in favour of Russia's accession to the Council of Europe at this point in time” (Bindig 1996). As 
argued before by Jordan, it appears that the Council preferred to keep Russia close rather than 
to isolate it. This way, the other members states of the Council could be the teachers of the 
common lifeworld for the Russian state and hopefully make Russia incorporate the Council’s 
norms and values over time.  
 The strategy of entering into dialogue with Russia was also due to the ongoing struggles 
between Russia and Chechnya. The Council of Europe viewed the Russian intervention in 
Chechnya as problematic and has continuously and thoroughly inspected Russian human rights 
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violations in Chechnya. Whereas the Council accused the Russian government of violating the 
ECHR in Chechnya, the Russian foreign minister at the time attempted to defend the Kremlin by 
calling upon Article 15 of the ECHR. According to this article, “in time of war or other public 
emergency threatening the life of the nation,” it is not necessary to follow the ECHR. He also 
argued that the war in Chechnya was an anti-terrorist operation and that the Russian state thus 
was not violating the ECHR (Jordan 2003, 682). Nevertheless the Council sanctioned the Russian 
government for its non-compliance to the Convention, suspended its voting rights in the 
Parliamentary Assembly for a period of one year, starting April 2000, and began the process for 
complete suspension of Russia as a member state (Jordan 2003, 684). When the Kremlin 
warned the Council that complete suspension would harm the relations between Russia and 
Europe, the Council quickly abandoned the process and reinstated Russia’s voting rights in 
January 2001. When analyzing the intervention in Ukraine and Russia’s behavior in the Council, 
it will become clear that the Council has suspended Russia’s voting rights several times during 
its membership, but eventually always attempts to mend the relationship between Russia and 
the Council. 
 Even though Russia has not kept its promise of living up to all of the Council’s criteria, 
the Kremlin has ratified several conventions; the ECHR, the European Convention for the 
Prevention of Torture and the Framework Convention for the Protection of Minorities.  The 
Council is still trying to overcome two main issues with the Russian government that have been 
present since its accession. The first is that even though there still is a moratorium, the Kremlin 
has not yet abolished the death penalty (CoE 2015a). The second is that even though Russia has 
ratified the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and the Council has already 
reported a lack of reform within Russia’s Internal Affairs structure, there are clear signs that 
torture is still used by law enforcement officials in Russia (CoE 2013). According to Saari, even 
though the Russian government cooperates with European organizations such as the Council of 
Europe and the OSCE, the Russians only do so under certain conditions which promote their 
own interests (Saari 2008, 120). As argued before, if this is the case this self-promotion will 
eventually lead to conflict within the organizations. These two issues show that the Russian 
government puts its sovereignty before important ECHR norms (Jordan 2003, 685). The lack of 
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reform by the Russian government and differences between European liberal and democratic 
norms and values and Russian ones, have led to continuous struggles within the Council. That 
Russia appears to cooperate with the Council of Europe under certain conditions points to Type 
I socialization, but the (partial) ratification of the various conventions shows that there must be 
some level of internalization of the Council’s norms and values in Russia. Of course, this might 
have been the minimal adaptation the Russian state had to go through in order to gain the 
benefits of the Council, namely international legitimacy and trust.  
 
2.3. Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe was organized in 1975 as the 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) to function “as a multilateral forum 
for dialogue and negotiation between East and West” (OSCE 1995). The Soviet Union was one 
of the organizers of the Conference. In 1994, the CSCE changed its name to the OSCE, due to its 
institutionalization and to strengthen the political aspect of the organization (Galbreath & 
Seidyusif 2014, 656; Tudyka 1998, 112). When the CSCE/OSCE was founded in 1975, all 
founding states signed the final act, the so-called Helsinki Final Act, which encompasses several 
politically binding commitments to the organization. In 2016, during one of the Annual Session 
of the Parliamentary Assembly of the OSCE, the participating states renewed their commitment 
to the “respect for the principles of the inviolability of frontiers and territorial integrity, 
peaceful settlement of disputes, equal rights, and self-determination of peoples” which can be 
considered as the most relevant characteristics of the common lifeworld of the OSCE for the 
purpose of this thesis (OSCEPA 2016). The Helsinki Final Act also founded the Helsinki 
Approach, which is the OSCE’s approach to security based on the idea of the security 
community as a forum for non-violent issue resolution as explained above. The OSCE “has a 
comprehensive approach to security that encompasses politico-military, economic and 
environmental, and human aspects. (…) All 57 participating States enjoy equal status, and 
decisions are taken by consensus on a politically, but not legally binding basis” (OSCE, a).  
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Unlike the Council of Europe, the OSCE does not have member states. According to 
Krasner, this indicates that the organization is built on norms and rules that all participating 
states recognize (Krasner 1982, 195; Adler & Barnett 1998b, 18). The OSCE presents itself as 
being a very inclusive organization and is indeed the only European security organization in 
which Russia is a founder and participant. The OSCE has several bodies and institutions such as 
the Secretariat, the Minsk Group, the Permanent Council and the Parliamentary Assembly, also 
abbreviated as OSCEPA. The OSCEPA works towards better dialogue between national 
governments, develops mechanisms for conflict prevention and resolution, supports 
consolidation of democratic principles in participating states and monitors the implementation 
of OSCE objectives (OSCEPA). Similar to the Council, the members of the OSCEPA are 
parliamentarians of the national governments of participating states. The Permanent Council is 
the decision-making body of the OSCE and implements decisions from the OSCE Summits and 
Ministerial Council (OSCE, b). It consists of representatives of the participating states, including 
the delegates of the OSCEPA. Similar to the Council of Europe, the OSCE has the ability to 
suspend participating states from the Permanent Council or suspend their voting rights 
(Galbreath & Seidyusif 2014, 659). 
 
2.3.1 Russia in the Organization for Security and Cooperation 
Of course Russia, in the form of the former Soviet Union, as one of the organizing states of the 
CSCE, and later the OSCE had its own interests in creating an international organization that 
would work towards security in the region. According to Galbreath and Seidyusif, the main 
interest of the Kremlin lay in the creation of an organization that would dissuade states to 
strengthen their relations with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and its strong 
Western European and American influence (Galbreath & Seidyusif 2014, 659). From the first 
conference onwards, the Russian government therefore was more interested in forming a 
security forum than a humanitarian one. Russian delegates for instance lobbied for the creation 
of several institutions and the creation of a legal identity for the OSCE in order to create a 
strong alternative to NATO (Ghebali 2005, 277).   
  S1627511 
29 
 
However, Russian support for the OSCE turned around. In the eyes of the Kremlin the 
OSCE had lost its reputation of a well-functioning organization for European security over time 
(Dominguez et al. 2014, 66; Galbreath & Seidyusif 2014, 657). First of all the Kremlin criticized 
the OSCE’s mission in Georgia and stated that the OSCE did not meet its standards when 
necessary during the conflict (Galbreath & Seidyusif 2014, 661). Second, the OSCE’s Office for 
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) supported the colored revolutions in 
Ukraine and other post-Soviet republics by providing monitoring of elections and supporting 
the civil society in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan (Galbreath 2009, 167 – 174). This, in 
combination with the fact that the OSCE had evolved into much more of a humanitarian 
organization, triggered the Russian government to withdraw its support for the OSCE and to 
seriously doubt its neutrality. Russian delegates accused the OSCE of having double standards, 
or even an ‘east of Vienna’ bias (Galbreath & Seidyusif 2014, 660; Galbreath 2009, 161).  
According to Bloed, the OSCE has reclaimed its reputation as a well-functioning organization for 
collective security with its actions in the Ukrainian crisis which erupted with the Euromaidan in 
the winter of 2013 (Bloed 2014, 145). Now, according to Kropatcheva, the Russian government 
addresses the institutions of the OSCE individually in order to accomplish its own agenda most 
effectively (Kropatcheva 2012, 382). This notion would also argue that Russian behavior in the 
OSCE can be labeled as Type I socialization.  
 
2.4. The Council of Europe and the OSCE and the Conflict in Ukraine 
2.4.1 OSCE and the Conflict in Ukraine 
The question now remains why the OSCE was able to reclaim its legitimacy during the outbreak 
of the conflict in Ukraine. According to Kropatcheva, the OSCE is the perfect organization to 
work towards a resolution for that conflict, due to its observation experience in the Crimean 
conflict in the 1990s and its experience in strengthening Russian-Western relations 
(Kropatcheva 2015, 16). At first, the Russian government did not want any OSCE visits to Crimea 
(Kropatcheva 2015, 17). Eventually though, the Russian government accepted the monitoring 
missions. After the pro-European protests in Kiev in 2013, the OSCE launched three missions to 
promote peace and stability in Ukraine. Two of these missions were monitoring missions in the 
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Donbass region, whilst the third is the ‘Trilateral Contact Group’. The latter is the only forum 
where representatives of Russia and Ukraine have had peace talks for a resolution for the 
fighting in Ukraine (Remler 2015, 89).  
In addition to OSCE’s previous experience with Crimea, Russia and Ukraine are both 
OSCE participating states. This provided the OSCE with the ability to play an important role in 
the negotiations between Russia and Ukraine and OSCE has actively tried to reduce the 
tensions between the two states. With the Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SSM), the 
OSCE promotes security and stability through dialogue and, according to the OSCE’s official 
website: “… monitors and reports on developments on the ground throughout Ukraine, 
including the implementation of the Minsk Agreements” (OSCE, 2016a). The second monitoring 
mission monitors two border crossings between Russia and Ukraine, Donetsk and Gukovo. In 
these areas OSCE observers aim to reduce tensions near the border (OSCE, 2016b). Also, the 
Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE, a role exercised by a minister of foreign affairs of one of the 
participating states on an annual rotating basis, actively tries to continue negotiations between 
Russia and Ukraine in order to reduce tensions (Bloed 2014, 147).  
Finally, with the Trilateral Contact Group, representatives from the OSCE play a very 
important role in the conflict resolution, by facilitating peace talks with Ukraine and Russia in 
order to work towards a resolution for the fighting in Ukraine (Remler 2015, 89). The first of 
two agreements reached by the Trilateral Contact Group was the Minsk I agreement in 
September 2014. The negotiations on this agreement were organized by the OSCE, through the 
Trilateral Contact Group, which was thus set up in order to find a solution to the conflict with all 
the involved parties around the table (Terrence Hopman 2015, 44).  This protocol was supposed 
to ensure a ceasefire, the release of illegal prisoners, retreat of military presence and weapons 
from Ukraine and a monitoring mission by the OSCE to ensure that the protocol would be 
respected. Unsurprisingly, the Minsk Protocol was violated by the pro-Russian separatists when 
they seized the airport in Donetsk, thus new peace talks had to be held in 2015. On February 12 
2015, a new ceasefire agreement, Minsk II, was signed by the same parties. This time, not only 
the Trilateral Contact Group Special Representative was present at the negotiations, but the 
leaders of Germany and France, Chancellor Merkel and President Hollande, were in attendance 
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as well. For the second time, the leaders of the parties in conflict agreed to ensure a ceasefire, 
release illegally detained prisoners and remove military presence and weapons from the 
conflict areas (EPRS 2015). The ceasefire agreement was violated only three days after it was 
signed, and thus the fighting, however decreased, continued (EPRS 2016). 
Also, in response to Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its support to the Russian 
separatists, the OSCEPA has adopted several resolutions condemning Russia’s actions in 
Ukraine. In 2014 the OSCEPA adopted the resolution “The Continuation of Clear, Gross and 
Uncorrected Violations of the OSCE Commitments and International Norms by the Russian 
Federation.” In this resolution the OSCEPA reminds the Russian state that it has signed the 
Helsinki Final Act and thus is expected to behave accordingly. On top of that, the OSCEPA 
condemns Russia’s annexation of Crimea and calls upon other states not to recognize 
annexation and the referendum in Crimea (OSCEPA 2014). In 2015, during the annual session in 
Helsinki, the OSCEPA again adopted a resolution condemning Russian actions in Ukraine, 
requesting Russia to release illegal prisoners, asking to see that the perpetrators of the missile 
attack on Malaysian Airlines flight MH17 are being prosecuted and convicted, and requesting 
Russia to abide by the Minsk I and Minsk II agreements and to stop supplying weapons and men 
to the separatists in the east of Ukraine (OSCEPA 2015). In 2016, when still none of these 
requests had been met by Russia, the OSCEPA again adopted a resolution condemning and 
requesting the same as in the resolutions of 2014 and 2015. Even though the OSCE appears to 
be a promising organization in terms of conflict resolution, at least in organizing peace-talks, its 
ability to sanction remains weak and ineffective. Besides reprimanding Russia for its actions, it 
appears that the OSCE does not actually sanction Russia.  
 
2.4.2 Council of Europe and the Conflict in Ukraine 
The Council of Europe on the other hand, of which also both Russia and Ukraine are member 
states, has attempted from the beginning of the conflict to help the Ukrainian government to 
fulfill its obligations to the organization and the ratified conventions by setting up the 
Immediate Measures Package for Ukraine. According to the Council itself, the package was set 
up especially to contribute “to the effectiveness of the investigations from a human rights 
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perspective following the Maidan demonstrations” (CoE, c). More importantly in terms of 
sanctioning Russia, the PACE is trying to get Russia to abide by its commitments to the Council. 
The PACE has done so by withdrawing Russia’s voting rights and participation in election 
observations in April 2014 until the end of the year (PACE 2014, Resolution 1990). In response, 
Russia decided to suspend all of its contact with the PACE starting after the Annual Session of 
January 2015 (PACE 2015b, Resolution 2063). The suspension of contact with the PACE is 
ongoing today. Russian delegates do still join the sessions of other bodies of the Council of 
Europe though, such as the Ministerial Committee and the Presidential Committee. Ever since 
the Russian delegates decided to suspend the contacts with the PACE, there is an ongoing 
discussion during all PACE sessions on the conflict in Ukraine, where multiple delegations such 
as the Spanish, Finnish, German, British and Dutch reiterate their preference for an open 
dialogue with the Russian delegation instead of the suspension of contacts.3 This indicates that 
the Council’s ideas on keeping Russia close has not changed and that, similarly to the 
suspension of Russian voting rights in the 1990s, the Council would typically retreat from its 
sanctions when the Russian delegation does not seem to be pushed to internalization by being 
placed in the out-group.  
 
2.5. Conclusion 
Therefore, things to look for in order to assess what the degree of socialization in the OSCE and 
the Council of Europe is, are mentions of human rights such as the freedom of speech, freedom 
of press and freedom of non-discrimination, In case of the Council of Europe the protection of 
minority rights is an important value to look for as well. In addition, for both organizations also 
democratic values such as the right to free and fair elections, territorial integrity and the right 
to self-determination are terms to look for in the statements. Based on their mission, history 
and experiences with interacting with Russia, both the OSCE and the Council of Europe are 
interesting organizations to analyze the degree of socialization of the Russian delegations to 
these organizations. Both the OSCE and the Council of Europe are likely places for socialization 
                                                          
3 Appendix A, PACE AS 2014 CR 29; PACE AS 2014 CR 28; PACE AS 2014 CR 25; PACE AS 2015 CR 24; PACE AS 2015 
CR 23. 
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for three reasons; both organizations work via self-selection, can provide legitimacy for their 
member states or participating states, and Russia has been a part of both over a long period of 
time, thus in the OSCE as well as the Council of Europe the socialization process is bound to 
have been set in motion quite some years ago. However, it has now become clear that even 
though Russia has joined both organizations while being committed to certain rules, norms and 
values on paper, the Russian government has consistently omitted to reform internally and is 
now ignoring the conventions it has committed to in the first place.  
 In its attempts to get Russia on board with the conventions, the PACE has suspended 
Russia’s voting rights twice since its accession. At first glance this appears to be a harsh 
sanction, but when the Council announced that it was going to take steps to suspend Russia 
completely and the Russian delegation warned that that would affect the relations with Europe, 
the Council immediately retreated. Even now, with the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, from the 
moment the Russian delegation had its voting rights suspended, there has been an ongoing 
discussion on many delegations’ desire for a dialogue with their Russian colleagues. Thus it 
seems that even today the Council continues its rhetoric of keeping Russia close rather than 
isolating it.  
 During the analysis of the statements of the Russian delegation in the OSCE and the 
Council of Europe it will be necessary to keep in mind that on the one hand the Council does 
sanction Russia for its non-compliance to the multiple conventions. Through these sanctions 
though, the Council offers the Russian delegation political leverage by retreating when Russia 
threatens to worsen its relations with Europe or the Council itself. On the other hand it is 
important to keep in mind that even though Russia appears to have more leverage in the 
Council, Russia prefers to work with the OSCE because of the possibilities to use multiple OSCE 
bodies for its own interests. Russia has been reprimanded several times in the OSCE for its 
actions in Ukraine through resolutions, but has never been suspended in any way. This probably 
provides the Russian delegation more freedom and opportunities to use the OSCE for its own 
benefit than the Council of Europe does.   
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Chapter 3  
Russian Ukraine Policy and Conflicting Views on the Ukrainian Conflict 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The West, the Russian government, the Ukrainian government and scholars all have their own 
perceptions on the conflict in Ukraine. For the Russian government, its Ukraine policy plays a 
particularly important role in the conflict itself as well as in the Russian views on the conflict. 
Due to its Ukraine policy, Moscow was already involved in Ukrainian affairs long before the 
Euromaidan protests started in November 2013. However, Russia’s involvement in Ukraine 
greatly increased when the Ukrainian government and President Yanukovych were ousted after 
the protests in 2014 and the Kremlin decided to annex Crimea. The conflict in Ukraine is 
particularly complex because of the many parties involved in the conflict and their contradicting 
explanations of the events. Not only Russia plays an important role in the conflict, but of course 
Ukraine itself, the Luhansk and Donetsk People’s Republics, and the West in the form of 
international organizations and national governments as well.  
Due to the complexity of the conflict, it is necessary to understand the Russian Ukraine 
policy and the wide range of perceptions on the conflict before analyzing the minutes of the 
meetings and the statements made by the Russian delegations of both the OSCE and the 
Council of Europe. This way, it will be possible to assess the statements within the right context. 
This chapter will first give a short overview of the history of Russian-Ukrainian relations. Then it 
will elaborate on Russia’s Ukraine policy based on a literature review and the two most recent 
Foreign Policy Concepts. Finally, the different official views of Russia, Ukraine and the West on 
the Ukraine crisis will be explained. This chapter will argue that the Russian context for its 
meddling in Crimea is because of its defensive and assertive policy in Ukraine and its self-
appointed role as a big brother of the ethnic Russians and the Russian-speaking minority in 
Ukraine, specifically in Crimea and Donbass.  
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3.2 The Conflict in Ukraine 
As stated in the introduction, in order to be able to analyze the statements of the Russian 
delegations in the OSCE and the Council of Europe concerning the conflict in Ukraine, it is 
necessary to understand the conflict first. Already before the present conflict in Ukraine, 
Ukraine was known to struggle with its position of being stuck between Russia and Europe. On 
the one hand, Ukraine supposedly functions as a buffer zone between Russia and the EU and 
NATO, whilst on the other hand Ukraine can be perceived as Russia’s ‘gate to Europe’ (Plokhy 
2015, xxi). The present conflict started with the domestic political crisis in Ukraine, when 
Ukrainian President Yanukovych announced in November 2013 that instead of signing the 
Association Agreement with the EU, he leaned towards signing a gas deal with Russia, which 
encompassed lower gas prices and a loan worth $15 billion to help the Ukrainian government 
with its existing debt. In a reaction to this announcement, pro-European protesters gathered in 
Kiev. These protests, also known as the Euromaidan, started off as non-violent demonstrations, 
but grew more and more violent over the course of time. Multiple clashes between protesters 
and the Ukrainian police and Berkut, the Ukrainian Special Forces, who were sent in by the 
government, led to deaths amongst the protesters (Traynor & Walker 2014).  When 
Yanukovych was toppled at the end of February, tensions in Ukraine increased. Particularly 
when the interim government of Ukraine was announced, with Oleksandr Turchynov as acting 
President - a man who was committed to ‘Ukraine’s European choice’-  violence was triggered 
in three important regions: Crimea in the south of Ukraine, and Donetsk and Luhansk in the 
east of Ukraine, both sharing a border with the Russian Federation (Herszenhorn 2014; Stern 
2014). 
The first region in which violence erupted was the Crimean peninsula  where a 58% 
majority of its population is a native Russian speaker according to a 2001 census (BBC 2014a). 
Pro-Russian separatists seized government buildings in Crimea and demanded a referendum to 
decide on Crimea’s self-determination. The referendum, although rejected as rigged and 
denounced as illegal by the West, concluded that 95.5% of the voters wanted reunification with 
Russia (Kropatcheva 2015, 16; Morris 2014; BBC 2014a).  In response to the referendum,  so-
called ‘little green men’ annexed Crimea. According to the West, these little green men were 
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the Russian Special Forces, who had simply gotten rid of their insignias, together with 
individuals who defected from the Ukrainian military and joined the Russians (Pinkham 2017; 
Karagiannis 2016, 139; Lee Myers ea. 2014; BBC 2014b). This means that in the eyes of the 
West and of the pro-Western interim government in Kiev, Russia has illegally annexed the 
Crimean peninsula.   
The annexation of Crimea was not the end of the growing tensions in Ukraine. According 
to Western leaders such as the President of the United States, the Kremlin actively supported 
the pro-Russian separatists, or rebels, in the regions of Luhansk and Donetsk by deploying the 
Russian military and sending in weapons under the disguise of humanitarian convoys to the 
rebels (Luhn 2014). Rebels in these two regions as well seized government buildings and 
demanded referenda for self-determination. The referenda on unification with Russia were 
eventually organized in both Luhansk and Donetsk. Similar to the referendum in Crimea, they 
were not recognized as legitimate by the international community, but nonetheless the 
Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics were declared. Together, these two regions are also 
known as the Donbass. As stated in the introduction, this is when the Ukrainian armed forces 
advanced with an anti-terrorist operation. This was the first time the Ukrainian military came 
into action, since the post-Soviet republic’s military was neglected after the fall of the Soviet 
Union and was not adequately organized to act during the Euromaidan (Karagiannis 2016, 142).  
Tensions between Russia and the West only increased further when on July 17, 2014  
Malaysian Airlines passenger flight MH17 from Amsterdam to Kuala Lumpur was shot down by 
a Buk missile when it flew over Ukrainian territory. A Joint Investigation Team (JIT), in which 
Ukraine, Belgium, Malaysia, Australia and the Netherlands jointly researched the airplane crash, 
concluded that the Buk missile was fired from the rebel-controlled area of Donetsk and that the 
missile was transported from Russia just before the aircraft was shot down (JIT 2016). This 
would mean that the missile was shot by the pro-Russian rebels and that the Russians would 
have supplied the pro-Russian separatists with the missile. These conclusions were promptly 
rejected by the Russian government, arguing that the research was not based on supportive 
sources and evidence (Harding & Luhn 2016). The fighting in Donbass only intensified and the 
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death toll increased while the international community searched some sort of ceasefire 
agreement between the conflicting parties.  
 
3.3 Russian Ukraine Policy  
3.3.1 Russian - Ukrainian Relations History 
Russia and Ukraine have strong historical ties, dating back to Kievan Rus’, in the 9th century. 
Even though Ukrainians claim that their history of Kievan Rus’ is a separate one, Russians 
believe that the Kievan Rus’ is a shared history between the two peoples (Plokhy 2015, 195). In 
the Russian perception, this led to the idea that Ukrainians not only share a history with 
Russians, but that they are actually one people. However, in this perception the two peoples 
are not completely equal. As early as the 18th century, Russians already identified the 
Ukrainians as ‘Little Russians’. The term Little Russians implies that Ukrainians are the younger 
brothers of the Russians and thus a less strong people than the Russians. Russia also believes 
itself to be the historic motherland of the post-Soviet states and sees Ukraine as a ‘brotherly 
state’ (Simão 2016, 505; Kappeler 2014, 110; Bogomolov & Lytvynenko 2012, 1). This means 
that in the Russian perception there is no room for a national Ukrainian identity, but only for a 
regional one (Ryabchuk 2010, 8). On this topic Russian president Putin even stated that 
“Ukraine is not even a country” during the NATO summit in 2008 (Stent 2014), which clearly 
illustrates that the Russians do not respect Ukrainian territorial integrity in the first place. This 
Russian way of thinking has made it very hard for Ukraine to detach itself from Russia both 
culturally and historically.  
Besides the difficulties of detaching itself from Russia culturally and historically, Russia 
and Ukraine have strong political and economic ties as well. As early as during the beginning of 
the 1990s Russia started its own neighborhood policy in order to maintain its sphere of 
influence to be able to regain its position as a superpower in the international community. This 
policy is still being pursued today through which the Russian government simply attempts to 
ensure its security and geopolitical interests in its ‘backyard’ (Götz 2015, 7). In practice this 
means that Russia applies pressure on Ukraine by pulling Ukraine back within its orbit 
whenever it seeks closer relations with the West. As will become clear from the literature 
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review, Ukraine is specifically important for the Russian neighborhood policy compared to 
other post-Soviet republics, due to Russia’s economic and geopolitical interests in Ukraine. This 
neighborhood policy, combined with Russia’s idea that Ukraine is a brotherly state, causes the 
Russian leadership’s discourse to refuse recognition of Ukraine as a sovereign country.  
 On top of this lack of recognition towards Ukraine, Putin’s discourse is that it is very 
much responsible for the protection of the rights of ethnic Russians and Russian-speaking 
minority living in Ukraine. In Putin’s words, “millions of Russians and Russian-speaking citizens 
live (…) in Ukraine, and Russia will always defend their interests through political, diplomatic 
means” (as cited by Mankoff 2014). This argument was also used by Moscow when the little 
green men, or in the eyes of the West, the Russian Special Forces annexed Crimea. When Putin 
announced the annexation, he stated that Russia annexed Crimea and backs the pro-Russian 
separatists in Donbass in order to protect the rights of the ethnic Russians and Russian-speaking 
minority living in these regions (IISS 2014, VIII). This statement shows Putin’s motivation to act 
as a big and protective brother towards the ethnic Russians and the Russian-speaking minority 
who are supposedly in danger. The statement also creates the expectation that the Russian 
delegation, at least in the Council of Europe, where it has ratified the Convention on the 
Protection of Minority Rights, will call upon this convention to explain its actions in Ukraine. 
Since Ukraine’s independence after the fall of the Soviet Union, the Ukrainian 
government has attempted to build closer ties with Europe. With the contested Association 
Agreement that Ukrainian President Yanukovych failed to sign by accepting the Russian gas 
deal, Ukraine even sought integration into the European Union. Unfortunately, whenever 
Ukraine attempts to detach itself from Russia, the relations between Russia and Ukraine appear 
to deteriorate. Now, with the conflict, not only Russian – Ukrainian relations, but also Russia’s 
relations with Europe have deteriorated.  
 
3.3.2 Russian Ukraine Policy  
Even though Ukraine might wish for closer relations with the West, Russia still has substantial 
influence in Ukraine due to a variety of interests. These interests in Ukraine and Russian 
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Ukraine policy have been widely discussed in academia and will be explained in this section.  
When looking at Russian interests in Ukraine, these interests appear to be mostly based on 
Russian domestic and territorial security. When imagining that these interests might have been 
threatened due to Ukraine’s new pro-European government, it does not seem surprising that 
Moscow felt the need to intervene in Ukraine.  
First of all, being the largest and historically most connected state for Russia, Ukraine 
plays an important role in the Russian neighborhood policy. If Russia loses Ukraine it loses such 
a great part of its influence in the region, the formation of a Eurasian Union for example, results 
in a useless effort to counterbalance the European Union. Second, Ukraine and Russia share a 
very long border which indicates that Ukraine is of geopolitical importance for Russia (Götz 
2015, 3; Tsygankov 2015, 281). Russian strategic assets such as the Black Sea Fleet in Crimea 
and strong economic ties, mostly gas and oil-related, would be lost if Ukraine would cut its ties 
with Russia and pursue a pro-Western foreign policy. If Ukraine would join NATO for example, 
NATO would expand towards Russian borders, and consequently have better access to military 
intervention in Russia. Putin has warned the international community multiple times that NATO 
enlargement threatens Russian national security and that the Kremlin would do “anything to 
prevent it” (Simão 2016, 503; Tsygankov 2015, 295). This became very clear when the Putin 
administration annexed Crimea, showing a defensive attitude towards its interests in Ukraine 
which might influence Russian territorial security. At first it appeared that Yanukovych was 
going to sign the Association Agreement, which would already result in decreased possibilities 
for influencing Ukraine. Fortunately for Moscow, President Putin was able to lure Yanukovych 
away from the Association Agreement by offering a discount on gas prices delivered from 
Russia to Ukraine. However, when Yanukovych was toppled and elections put forward a pro-
European president, Moscow understood that the possibilities for influencing Ukraine were 
going to decrease nonetheless (Simão 2016, 503; Kropatcheva 2015, 15). According to several 
scholars, Putin’s strategy subsequently changed into supporting and managing instability in 
Ukraine by annexing Crimea and supporting pro-Russian separatists (Simão 2016, 492). This way 
Ukraine’s chances to become a NATO or EU member state are decreased, because it cannot 
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meet the requirements for a membership plan, which is again a very defensive strategy, which 
shows Russian assertiveness in meddling in Ukrainian affairs.  
In addition to President Putin’s clear attempts to maintain Ukraine within its sphere of 
influence and his statements on the protection of ethnic Russians and the Russian-speaking 
minority in Ukraine, the key primary documents from the Russian state on its foreign policy are 
the Foreign Policy Concepts. In February 2013 the Kremlin published a Foreign Policy Concept 
stating that “Russia will […] build up relations with Ukraine as priority partner within the CIS, 
contribute to its participation in extended integration processes” (Foreign Policy Concept 2013). 
This suggests that Ukraine is quite important within Russian foreign policy, even though Ukraine 
only gets mentioned after Belarus and Kazakhstan in the concept, which indicates that Ukraine 
might be considered a less important neighbor than these republics. Also, Ukraine only gets 
mentioned once in the 2013 Foreign Policy Concept, which was the last concept that was 
published before the Euromaidan.  
The subsequent Foreign Policy Concept was released in December 2016. Unsurprisingly, 
Ukraine’s role in this concept has changed due to the conflict, which at the time of publishing 
had already been waging continuously over two years. Ukraine again is only mentioned once in 
the concept when the Russian Foreign Ministry writes that “the Russian Federation is interested 
in developing political, economic, cultural and spiritual ties with Ukraine in all areas on the basis 
of mutual respect and commitment to building partnership relations with due regard for 
Russia’s national interests” and that Russia would like to resolve the conflict together with all 
other interested states (Foreign Policy Concept 2016). Ukraine’s role in the Foreign Policy 
Concept has clearly changed from being a priority partner before the crisis, to a state with 
which Russia surprisingly would like to develop a large variety of ties. Surprisingly, because 
these ties, according to Russian state’s discourse, already exist due to the shared culture and 
history of the two peoples. It also states that it is prepared to resolve the conflict together with 
specifically interested states, which seems odd because of Russia’s suspension of the ties with 
the Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly from April 2014 onwards while the Council 
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insists on a continuous dialogue to resolve the issue, already indicating that Russia’s strategy in 
handling the Ukrainian conflict is full of contradictions.4 
 
3.4 Controversies in the Ukrainian conflict 
In academia, in international politics and in the media the conflict in Ukraine has been classified 
as many different types of war, and there are still many contradicting views on how the conflict 
exactly erupted and who is to blame for it. The conflict has been classified as a civil war of the 
separatists, as the Russian invasion of Ukraine, as a hybrid war and even as terrorism 
(Medynskyi 2015). Most classifications appear feasible, except for the classification as a civil 
war of the separatists, because the Russian government has been involved in Ukrainian affairs 
even before the conflict erupted. More importantly, Moscow has a fair share in the conflict as 
well which makes it odd to speak of a civil war.  
In academia, the conflict has been defined as a war of the separatists, or an insurgency 
that has been started and is supported by Russia. Multiple scholars argue that there has been a 
shift in Russian Ukraine policy in 2013, from soft power to hard power (Götz 2015, 5; Haukkala 
2015, 34; Marten 2015, 195; Charap & Darden 2014, 9). One important example that shows this 
shift is that during similar events before the Euromaidan, such as the Orange Revolution in 
2004, Russia only reacted with soft power in Ukraine. After the Euromaidan though, Moscow 
decided to annex Crimea which is a definite shift from soft to hard power politics. But why did 
this shift take place? According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), Russia 
perceives the toppling of Yanukovych as a Western plot against Russian influence in Ukraine. 
According to this idea, the Euromaidan was started to enable regime change and quickly 
integrate Ukraine into the EU’s and NATO’s spheres of influence (IISS 2014, IX; Charap & Darden 
2014, 10).  Therefore, from the Kremlin’s perspective, an appropriate response and solution to 
this potential loss of influence was simple: an assertive foreign policy in order to secure Russian 
interests.  
                                                          
4 Appendix A, PACE AS 2014 CR 30, Addendum 1. 
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The Ukrainian view on the conflict is very much in line with the view of most scholars, 
namely that Russia has invaded Ukraine by annexing Crimea and that the Russian government is 
now supporting terrorism throughout the country by backing the Russian separatists in several 
ways. In a statement to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the Ukrainian 
delegation describes the situation in Ukraine as “the Russian Federation's territorial occupation 
of Crimea, a part of Ukraine, and the support for terrorists in the eastern part of Ukraine.”5 
Especially since it became clear that Russian citizens and particularly Russian soldiers were part 
of the pro-Russian separatist movement in Donbass, Ukrainian officials state that the Russian 
government is supporting and spreading terrorism. And while Moscow sent in its Special Forces 
to annex Crimea, the Kremlin continuously denies Russian military action in Donbass (Rauta 
2016, 99). This aggravates the Ukrainian government even more, and feeds the anger towards 
Russia’s occupation of Crimea.  
Not only the Ukrainian government, but for a short period the EU considered classifying 
the pro-Russian separatists as terrorists as well, because through this classification the EU 
would be legally able to freeze assets as part of the conflict resolution, but eventually decided 
against the classification as terrorists (Jozwiak & Shreck 2015). The European official view on 
the conflict is that the conflict can mostly be attributed to Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea 
and that it is the Russian armed forces that violate the territorial integrity of Ukraine (European 
Council 2015). Also, the European Council, not to be confused with the Council of Europe, 
believes that Russia is intentionally destabilizing Ukraine (European Council 2017). According to 
the EPP group, the largest political party in the European Parliament, the conflict is a hybrid war 
which is being waged by and was provoked by Russia, even though it has officially not been 
declared yet (EPP Group). A hybrid war is defined as a “conflict in which states or non-state 
actors exploit all modes of war simultaneously by using advanced conventional weapons, 
irregular tactics, terrorism, and disruptive technologies or criminality to destabilize an existing 
order,” which fits perfectly with EPP Group’s statements on the war in Ukraine (Wilkie 2009, 
14). The Euromaidan protests are considered to be a “popular democratic revolution”, which 
was supported by the OSCE (Kropatcheva 2015, 16). The EPP also states that the war is the 
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result of “Russia’s aggressive and expansionist policy,” which is a popular argument for Russian 
intervention in Ukraine (EPP Group). The official view of the United States on the conflict 
resonates these ideas. In a speech on the 25th anniversary of Freedom Day in Poland, United 
States President Obama stated that the annexation of Crimea is an aggressive Russian 
occupation and provocation which violates the sovereignty of Ukraine (Obama 2014).  
In reaction to the Russian intervention in Ukraine, its supply of arms and men to support 
the rebels in eastern Ukraine and the illegal annexation and occupation of Crimea, the West has 
imposed a large number of sanctions on Russia since 2014. The United States’ sanctions on 
Russia consisted of freezing assets and travel restrictions for Russian President Putin’s ‘inner 
circle’ and defense companies in Russia, limiting the finance of several important Russian banks 
and energy companies and discouraging exports to Russia (US Department of State). These 
sanctions still continue to this day, although newly elected United States President Trump 
announced that he wanted to propose a ‘nuclear arms reduction deal’ to Russia in order to stop 
the ongoing sanctions (Falconbridge & James 2017). However, the United States Senate passed 
a bill for new sanctions in June 2017 and President Trump announced the new sanctions on 
June 20, 2017 (Herb 2017; Rappeport & MacFarquhar 2017). The European Union, in 
cooperation with the United States, also imposed travel restrictions and asset freezes for a 
number of elites in Russia who are connected to President Putin, banned any long-term loans 
for Russian state banks, banned arm-deals with Russia and called off the EU-Russia summit 
(European Council 2017; BBC 2014d). On top of that, the European Union decided to move the 
G8 Summit  of 2014 from Sochi in Russia to Brussels and disinvited the Russian Federation 
(European Council 2017). The G8 has not met since the start of the sanctions, but has only 
taken place in the composition of the G7. More recently, in June 2017, the European Union 
announced that the asset freezes and travel restrictions would be extended until at least 
September 2017 (European Council 2017). 
 The Russian government reacted to the sanctions that have been imposed by the 
West with counter-sanctions, showing Russian assertive policy in dealing with the conflict and 
persistence with keeping to the Russian point of view. First, in March 2014, the Russian Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs announced the travel restrictions for several United States officials and in 
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2015 added a blacklist with officials from European Union member states (Russia Today 2014a; 
Sehmer 2015). A couple of months later, in August of the same year, President Putin signed a 
decree which banned agricultural products from the countries that imposed sanctions on Russia 
for a period of one year, but these restrictions have by now been extended to the end of 2017 
(Russia Today 2014b; Russia Today 2016).                                                                                        
The Russian official view on the conflict completely contradicts the Ukrainian and 
Western view on the conflict. The Russian official view is that the toppling of Yanukovych was a 
coup due to the rise of neo-Nazis and ultra-nationalism in Ukraine, which was made possible 
with the support and direct involvement of the US and the EU who want to “contain Russia” 
(Marples 2016, 425 - 427). Russian President Putin’s explanation of the events in Ukraine 
completely contradicts the news coverage in the West. According to United States President 
Obama, “Putin delivered a version of the crisis almost entirely at odds with the view held by 
most officials in Europe and the United states, as well as by many Ukrainians. (…) I know 
President Putin seems to have a different set of lawyers making a different set of 
interpretations but I don’t think that’s fooling anybody” (as cited by Lee Myers ea. 2014). As 
stated before, the Russian government argues as well that the rights of the ethnic Russians in 
Crimea were in need of protection because of the civil war in Ukraine. The result of the regime 
change in Kiev, which is the result of the US and EU support for the Euromaidan, is a new 
Ukrainian ultra-nationalist and radical government which neglects the rights of the ethnic 
Russians and Russian-speaking minority in Crimea, by changing the language law which 
protected the Russian language within Ukraine (Marples 2016, 428; Kropatcheva 2015, 16). 
According to the official statements, the annexation of Crimea was executed by ‘unidentified 
military’ or ‘polite green men’ and was also a strategy to protect Russia’s Black Sea Fleet and 
keep NATO out of Crimea (Kropatcheva 2015, 16). As will become evident in the analysis of the 
statements of the Russian delegates in the OSCE and the Council, the accusations towards 
Ukraine of supporting ultra-nationalism plays an important role in the Russian explanations of 
the conflict.   
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3.5 Conclusion 
Thus Russia’s lack of recognition of Ukrainian sovereignty is a problem that has led to 
frustration in Ukraine and has eventually resulted in a complicated conflict with multiple actors 
involved. Russia’s perception of Ukraine as a little brother, as well as its economic and 
geopolitical importance to Russia drove Moscow to push for greater influence and for keeping 
Ukraine within its orbit. However, because Ukraine was interested in closer relations with the 
West as well, it became a game of pushing and pulling. These contradicting ideas have also led 
to very opposing views on the conflict. Because both Russia and Ukraine believe that their 
perception of the conflict is the correct one, neither one of them will easily adjust its rhetoric 
and thus its actions. 
 With the various perceptions of the Ukraine conflict in the back of our heads, and 
Russian national interests in Ukraine, it is clearer in what context to interpret the statements of 
the Russian delegates in the international organizations, which will be analyzed in the next 
chapter. The Russian context is a defensive (defend Russian interests) as well as an assertive 
(Russian interests are at stake) one, while taking up the role of the big protective brother for 
the neglected rights of the ethnic Russians and the Russian-speaking minority in Crimea and 
Donbass.  
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Chapter 4 
Analysis of Statements of the Russian Delegation in the Council of Europe 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter will analyze the statements made by the Russian delegation in meetings of the 
Council of Europe from 2014 onwards, concerning the conflict in Ukraine. The focus of this 
analysis is to assess the degree of socialization of Russia in the form of its delegation in the 
Council, as well as to possibly determine whether Russia’s socialization can be categorized as 
Type I or Type II. In order to conduct a thorough analysis, it is important to keep a number of 
observations from the previous chapters in mind. First of all, as stated in the second chapter, 
because of the similarity in the rhetoric of the delegates from the Russian Federation, the 
Russian delegation will be treated as one actor with one degree of socialization rather than as 
composed of a set of individuals each with their own degree of socialization.   
Second, in order to understand the Russian delegation’s interests in the Council it is 
necessary to first remember what Russian interests in Ukraine are and understand the 
importance of Ukraine for Russian foreign policy. As became clear in the previous chapter, 
Russia perceives Ukraine as a little brother with enormous geopolitical and economic 
importance to Moscow. Consequently, the Kremlin has a defensive and assertive attitude 
towards Ukraine and the conflict.  
Third, the common lifeworld of the Council of Europe plays an important role. As has 
been stated before, according to the Council of Europe itself it is the leading organization for 
human rights on the continent, which makes it credible that the common lifeworld of the 
Council is based on democratic norms and values and respect for human rights and the rule of 
law, such as the freedom of speech, freedom of press, freedom of movement, and democratic 
principles such as the right to self-determination, the right to free and fair elections and 
territorial integrity (Council of Europe, 2017). Also, because of Russian President Putin’s 
statement that Russia annexed Crimea in order to protect the Russian-speaking minority living 
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there, the Convention for the Protection of Minority Rights is important to keep in mind as part 
of the common lifeworld of the Council of Europe. With an idea of what the common lifeworld 
of the Council is, it becomes possible to argue to what degree the Russian state has internalized 
this common lifeworld and whether it can be categorized as Type I or Type II socialization. Of 
course, it is necessary to keep in mind that the Russian delegation has national interests besides 
their interest in the benefits that the Council of Europe can offer them. In the case of the 
Council, the offered benefits are legitimacy in the international political arena, which can be 
obtained by providing evidence of being trustworthy towards the other member states in the 
Council. 
 On top of that, it is important to understand the relationship between Russia and the 
Council of Europe.  Already at the time of its accession, Russia was not the perfect member 
state. The Russian Federation’s membership was accepted before it passed through the 
necessary reforms for accession, because the Council preferred to keep Russia close right after 
the fall of the Soviet Union. The Council hoped that this way, it could steer the development of 
the newly emerged republic towards a functioning democracy with the same norms and values 
that are shared by European states. Unfortunately the Council was not able to make Russia 
stick to its promise of ratifying the conventions that it signed with its accession. From that 
moment on, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe has attempted to get Russia 
to internalize the common lifeworld of the Council by sanctioning the Russian delegation. In 
theory it is more appealing to be part of the in-group, thus by becoming an outsider due to the 
sanctions, Russia would be more motivated to change towards internalization of the Council’s 
shared values. This hypothesis will only be true if the Council would be fixed on pushing the 
sanctions forward. In reality, however, the Council appears to retreat whenever Russia 
threatens to harm European-Russian relations in response to the Council’s sanctions. This 
chapter will show whether the Council’s strategy of occasionally placing Russia in the out-group 
pays off and eventually pushes for the socialization process of the Russian state, or whether the 
Council’s lack of persistence in sanctioning Russia harms the Russian socialization process.  
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4.2 Analysis of the minutes of the 2014 Annual Sessions of the Parliamentary Assembly 
For this chapter, only the minutes of the annual sessions of the PACE will be analyzed, since the 
other meetings by the Presidential Council and the Committee of Ministers are classified. The 
PACE has four Annual Sessions a year, which each consist of five-day meetings. During these 
meetings a great number of topics are up for debate, but for the purpose of this thesis I have 
only selected the specific debates that were devoted to the conflict in Ukraine which covered 
topics such as the functioning of democratic institutions, the humanitarian situation in Ukraine, 
refugees from Ukraine and  the unratified credentials of the Russian delegation. In these 
debates I looked for statements which are focused on the common lifeworld of the Council, 
such as the freedoms mentioned above; freedom of speech, movement, equality, the right to 
self-determination and the protection of minority rights.   
 
4.2.1 PACE Annual Winter Session of January 2014 
The 2014 Annual Session of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe took place 
from the 27th to 31st of January, with as one of its topics “the functioning of democratic 
institutions in Ukraine.” The rhetoric of the Russian delegation during this session on the 
conflict in Ukraine appears to remain quite constant. Ukrainian president Yanukovych had 
already accepted the Russian deal on cheaper gas and announced that he was going to put the 
talks for the Association Agreement on hold (Euronews 2013). The Euromaidan protests were 
still ongoing and at this moment the Ukrainian Special Forces and police clashed multiple times 
in riots with the protesters. On the 31st of January, Ukrainian president Yanukovych annulled 
the anti-protest laws that were adopted just two weeks before. The discussions on the conflict 
in the sessions of the PACE were mostly focused on ensuring to put a stop on the protests and 
the riots that had erupted from these protests. In its reaction to the first reports on the conflict, 
the Russian delegation made very clear that it felt that the complete depiction of the situation 
in Ukraine by the Council was “a rather fantastical view of events.”6 Also, in the draft report 
some requests towards the Russian state were made, that were supposed to help steer the 
crisis in the right direction. The Russian delegation reacted in a calm, but slightly threatening 
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tone that if the Parliamentary Assembly would attempt to push Russia to do certain things it 
would not do any good to the crisis, instantly confirming the described relationship between 
the PACE and the Russian delegation.7 
The Russian delegation also attempted to accuse the European Union of instigating the 
protests on Maidan square. In the first discussion on the functioning of democratic institutions 
in Ukraine, the Russian delegation stated that: 
“We are extremely frustrated to see that Ukraine seems to be becoming a battlefield between 
Russia and the European Union. There have been accusations that undue pressure is being 
exerted on Ukraine by Russia, despite the fact that we know that the European Union has been 
very active in Kiev and we have seen many representatives of the European Union there. Do you 
believe that Russia and the European Union should fight one another on the Ukrainian 
battlefield or should a different and more constructive approach be found?” 8 
 During the January 2014 session the reports on the conflict predominantly accused 
Russia of having pressured the Ukrainian government into the gas deal and away from the 
Association Agreement. According to the Council’s report, the consequence of this Russian 
meddling had been the outbreak of the protests. The Russian delegation was not keen on these 
allegations and did not appear to recognize the pressure that the report describes. The 
delegation even asked the PACE: “We are told in the report that some kind of pressure has 
been exerted by Russia, but what sort of pressure are we talking about?” and argued that the 
PACE was blind for the fact that the Russian state was actually trying to help the Ukrainian 
economy to flourish with the discount on gas prices and the $15 billion loan to pay off 
Ukrainian government debt (McElroy 2013).9 The Russian delegation thus attempted to turn 
the tables and accused the European Union of having exerted pressure on Ukraine instead of 
the Russians themselves, by claiming that European Union representatives were actively 
supporting the Euromaidan. The Russian delegation though remains quite polite with its 
question whether there should be a more constructive approach. Moreover, its question 
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encourages political dialogue, rather than a violent approach, which is one of the core ideas of 
the Council of Europe as a security community. It could thus be argued that, even though the 
Russian state might have pressured the Ukrainian government into signing the gas deal, 
Moscow was looking for a solution without using any military force upon Ukraine.  
Another important argument of the Russian delegation in the discussions on the conflict 
is that the West is depriving Russia and its post-Soviet neighbors of the chance to accomplish 
their own economic development by pushing Ukraine towards the Association Agreement:  
“Russia and other non-European Union countries also have the right to create their kind of 
customs union, to give a powerful impetus to our economic development. (…) The economic 
standards enshrined within the European Union are a kind of model for us and can inspire us, 
but we do not understand why we are not talking about the Ukraine crisis in the right way 
today; the discussion is being used to criticise Russia, Belarus and many other countries at an 
important stage of their development. We cannot agree with how the issue is being 
manipulated.” 10 
The argument that the conflict is being manipulated by the Council in order to be able to 
criticize Russia is an argument that has been repeated several times in the January 2014 
session. The Russian delegation felt that the reports were very much Western-biased. Also, due 
to the European Union’s pressure on Ukraine and the western politicians ignoring Ukraine’s 
interests, Russia argued that Ukraine would be deprived of its democratic choice to decide on 
its own whether it would join the Eurasian Customs Union or the European Union. On top of 
that, by saying that Russia also has the right to develop a customs union, inspired by the 
European Union, the Russian delegation attempted to show its willingness to develop itself and 
the post-Soviet republics towards a functioning economy similar to a European one. This 
suggests that Russia had internalized some of the (democratic) norms and values of the Council 
of Europe.  
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From the perspective of the Russian delegation, the European Union was not the only 
one that ignored the democratic and basic human rights such as the right to self-determination 
of Ukraine. The delegation expressed its concerns about the undermining of norms and values 
of the Council of Europe such as the freedom of speech multiple times, because of the way the 
PACE attempted to handle the Ukraine conflict. During the January 2014 session, the 
delegations in the PACE were discussing the possible suspension of the voting rights of the 
Ukrainian delegation. The Russian delegation could not have been clearer with its statement on 
this possible sanction when it argued that:  
“The last thing we should do is deprive anyone of voting rights. On the contrary, we should 
support freedom of expression and freedom and democracy. The amendment is completely 
unacceptable and we should not pass it under any circumstances. We are trying to strip Ukraine 
of its right to speak, and that is completely undemocratic.”11  
 Again, the Russian delegation’s rhetoric here appears to be that of a state that, in some 
degree, has internalized the democratic norms and values of the Council of Europe and is trying 
to uphold them by calling upon other member states to respect them. This rhetoric is echoed 
when the delegation states that it respects Ukraine’s “sovereignty and legitimately elected 
authorities.”12  
 
4.2.2 PACE Annual Spring Session of April 2014 
The second annual session of 2014 took place from the 7th to the 11th of April, with as main 
topics a request to reconsider the already ratified credentials of the delegation of the Russian 
Federation and an urgent debate on threats to the functioning of democratic institutions in 
Ukraine. At the time of the April 2014 session, Yanukovych had already fled Ukraine and the 
Euromaidan had come to an end. The Crimean population had overwhelmingly voted for joining 
the Russian Federation in the disputed referendum on the status of Crimea and Russia had 
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consequently annexed Crimea on the 18th of March. The discussions in the Parliamentary 
Assembly on the conflict in Ukraine had changed from a discussion on both Russian and 
Ukrainian efforts to reduce the tensions in Ukraine, to accusations towards Russia of breaking 
international law and leaving aside all democratic values that it was supposed to live by with 
the illegal annexation and occupation of Crimea. In terms of the blame for the regime change in 
Kiev, the Russian delegation clearly stated several times that it believed that the toppling of 
Yanukovych was a coup by racist and ultra-nationalist parties in Ukraine which support the Nazi 
ideology.13  
 The Russian delegation’s rhetoric during the April 2014 session did not change in 
comparison to the January session in terms of its accusations towards the Council. The 
delegation again argued that the reports on the situation in Ukraine, and particularly in Crimea, 
were extremely biased and that this bias was not going to lead to a solution for the conflict. On 
top of that, the delegation claimed that the reports are mostly false or cannot be supported 
with any evidence.14 The Russians described the report as “the most monstrous demonstration 
of double standards in the history of the Council of Europe.”15 The Russian delegation also 
unequivocally denied the annexation of Crimea by stating that there was no annexation in the 
first place, but rather that the Crimean people organized a free referendum and that there had 
been no aggression or military presence outside the Black Sea Fleet whatsoever.16 The Russian 
delegation did explain the breaking away of Crimea and the conflict in Ukraine as a fault of the 
West when discussing the insertion of the following potential amendment into PACE’s 
resolution on Ukraine: 
“Therefore it calls upon member States to facilitate redress for the injuries sustained by Ukraine 
due to the unlawful annexation of Crimea through effective cooperation with the Ukrainian 
authorities on the investigation of the circumstances of human rights violations which occurred 
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on the territory of the Crimean peninsula and a speedy response to their requests, as well as 
through mutual recognition of the courts' decisions.” 17 
The Russian delegation’s reaction was clear: 
“What the amendments say is not true. We should look at compensation for the stupid actions 
of western States – primarily the United States, but also countries in the Council of Europe – 
with regard to Ukraine. Unfortunately, what has happened in Ukraine is the result of mistakes 
made by western politicians who have crudely and wantonly intervened in the internal affairs of 
a sovereign State.” 18 
 Surprisingly, the Russian delegation does not mention the Convention for the Protection 
of Minority Rights in its defense on the accusation of illegally annexing Crimea. In line with the 
argument that the annexation of Crimea was the result of a free referendum and the mistake of 
the West, the Russian delegation continuously argued that the Council of Europe was forgetting 
about its shared democratic values and warned that the PACE should not to forget that its 
purpose was to provide “a platform for a constructive dialogue in order to protect democracy, 
and the rights and freedom of the citizens of our countries.”19 The Russian delegation also 
added that with the proposed resolutions that accused the Russian Federation of the 
annexation and illegal occupation of Crimea, the Parliamentary Assembly would “press the 
button of destruction of democracy and truth” because it ignored the legitimate Crimean 
referendum, refusing the rights of the Russian-speaking people that asked for a federal 
structure in Ukraine and enjoy the right to self-determination.20 The Russian delegation did not 
threat the Council of Europe in any way of aggravating the conflict, but only continuously 
pushed for amendments that would remove the accusations towards Russia’s illegal annexation 
and occupation. The delegation was in fact quite supportive of a resolution through the PACE, 
and asked the Assembly to “uphold our values and standards” as the Council of Europe consists 
of “a European family”, indicating that the delegation showed, or at least attempted to show, 
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its appreciation for the common lifeworld of and its identification with the Council of Europe 
and its member states.21  
 During the session of the 9th of April, the Russian delegation brought forward a large 
amount of amendments, but none were adopted and whenever the Russian delegation 
attempted to argue against amendments introduced by other states, they were adopted 
anyway. As one of its final statements, the Russian delegation stated that it felt discriminated 
against by the rapporteurs on the situation in Ukraine, because amendments brought forward 
by the delegation were being rejected “simply because it came from a member of the Russian 
delegation.”22 The day after, on the 10th of April, the PACE discussed potential sanctions on the 
Russian delegation due to the illegal annexation of Crimea, and decided to suspend Russia’s 
voting rights for the rest of the year, hoping to push Russia to respect the rules of the 
international community.  
4.2.3 PACE Summer and Fall Annual Sessions of June and September 2014  
Even though the Russian delegation’s voting rights were suspended in April 2014, the 
delegation was still expected to join the remaining two sessions from the 23rd to the 27th of 
June and from the 29th of September to the 3rd of October. During this time period, the war in 
Donbass in the east of Ukraine was exploding and was becoming more violent every day. Also, 
in July of the same year, Malaysian Airlines passenger flight MH17 was shot down over Ukraine 
by the Russian Buk missile, which led to new accusations towards Russia. On September 5, the 
Minsk Protocol was signed, the first cease-fire agreement between Russia and Ukraine. The 
Minsk Protocol, among other things, requested the release of illegally detained prisoners by 
Russia. One of the prisoners that Russia would have to release was Nadija Savchenko, a 
Ukrainian pilot who was arrested in Moscow on the charges of involvement in the murder on 
two Russian journalists. While Savchenko was imprisoned, she was elected as a parliamentarian 
in Ukraine and was appointed as one of the Ukrainian delegates to the Council of Europe which 
would give her parliamentary immunity. Already before signing the agreement, it was clear that 
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Russia would not accept the accusations of its military presence and illegal annexation of 
Crimea and Russia eventually did not release Savchenko (Reuters 2015; EPRS 2016). In response 
to the suspension of their voting rights, the Russian delegation decided to boycott the 
Parliamentary Assembly. With this move, the delegation showed that it had changed its 
attitude from showing the will to seek a political dialogue with Ukraine, to completely ignoring 
the dialogue with the PACE.  
During the June session, during which the Russian delegation’s absence was discussed, 
the Ukrainian delegation shared with the PACE that the Chairman, or Speaker, of Russia’s State 
Duma had written a letter to the president of the PACE, in which he claimed that the PACE was 
to blame for the Russian delegation’s absence (Naryshkin 2014).23 In September, the Russian 
delegation once again did not show up, and their absence remained a highly discussed topic. 
The United Kingdom’s delegation talked about how the Russian delegation had said during a 
meeting of the sub-committee that they “thought that Ukraine was not a sovereign State but a 
failed State.”24 Also, according to the United Kingdom’s delegation, the Russian delegation 
continuously denied the invasion of Ukraine as well as any Russian military or material presence 
in Ukraine and that the Russians were not willing to discuss Crimea.25 Showing that the other 
delegations in the PACE still criticized the Russian attitude towards the PACE’s norms and values 
and the Russian delegation’s unwillingness to participate in the sessions. The Russian 
delegation’s rhetoric thus definitely changed after the PACE decided to sanction Russia for its 
actions in Ukraine; instead of reminding the Council of the shared values it is supposed to 
uphold and protect, the Russian delegation decided to suspend all its contacts with the PACE. 
This clearly was not the effect that the PACE was hoping for, since with its sanctions, it wanted 
to push for an open dialogue and even more for the Russians to act in accordance with the 
PACE’s common lifeworld and international law. 
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4.3 Analysis of the minutes of the 2015 Annual Sessions of the Parliamentary Assembly 
4.3.1 PACE Annual Winter Session of January 2015 
After their absence during the 2014 Annual Summer and Fall Sessions, the Russian delegation 
did attend the Annual Winter Session of the 26th to the 30th of January, which included a debate 
on Ukraine's humanitarian situation. During this session the PACE would again discuss the 
sanctions for the Russian delegation owing to Russia’s role in the conflict in Ukraine and its 
continuous breaking of international law. At the time of the January 2015 session, Russia had 
not left Crimea and the war in Donbass was still ongoing. The Minsk Protocol had been violated 
by both Russia and Ukraine and thus had failed to uphold the ceasefire. Surprisingly, both the 
Russian delegation and the Chairman of the State Duma, Sergey Naryshkin, had informed the 
Presidential Committee of the Council of Europe of the fact that Russia was not a party in the 
Minsk Protocol, but that Russia was an observer to the peace talks and the ceasefire 
agreement.26 Because of this supposed role for Russia as an observer, it was impossible that the 
Russians had breached the Minsk Protocol and only the Ukrainian government was to be 
blamed for breaching the ceasefire agreement. The Russian delegation thus continued to deny 
their negative involvement in the conflict. During the January 2015 session, the Russian 
delegation’s attitude worsened and its tone became more aggressive towards the PACE.  
 First of all, similar to the 2014 sessions, the Russian delegation remained very persistent 
in opposing any accusation towards Russia and placed all of the blame on the European Union 
and especially the United States for the violence, mass killings of civilians and the support of 
Nazism in Ukraine.27 According to the Russian delegation, it was without any doubt the United 
States’ military and financial support that had caused the unrest to start in 2013, and led to the 
increased violence in Donbass. In an aggressive statement towards the United States and the 
European Union as its right hand in causing the conflict, the Russian delegation accused both 
for using Russia as a scapegoat in order for “the puppet masters in this dirty little game not to 
be held responsible.”28 This quote shows that the tone of the Russian delegation had changed 
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towards a more aggressive choice of words. Instead of blaming ‘the United States government’ 
by name, the delegation now chose to use ‘puppet masters’ to describe the United States; 
instead of using terminology like ‘external meddling in Ukrainian internal affairs’, it now had 
changed to ‘dirty little game’.  
 The Russian delegation also took a more aggressive stance than before in terms of 
blaming the West for supporting Nazism. Whereas in the 2014 sessions the Russian delegation 
mentioned radicalism and neo-Nazism only in passing, now the accusations were ample:  
“(…) Europe is applauding the ultra-right Ukrainian authorities who cruelly suppress any dissent. 
Their punitive squads use fascist symbols; they promulgate terms that stigmatise inhabitants of 
whole regions as second-rate people; they spill the blood of women, children and elderly people 
in Eastern Ukraine without care for any conventions. This is not a military operation. This is 
genocide and neo-Nazism. 
The root of the evil is the fact that the Nazis are deftly playing with liberal phraseology in order 
to win European support. And Europe is turning a blind eye to blood spilt and disregard for 
human rights, thinking that it can support any regime if this suits its geopolitical interests.”29  
 Russia alleged the United States for wanting to realize a democratic state in Ukraine by 
supporting radical rebels who turned out to be supporting the Nazi ideology.30 The Ukrainian 
delegation was not left unharmed either; the Russian delegation handed out leaflets outside of 
the session, which stated that Nadija Savchenko, Ukrainian delegate to the Council of Europe, 
who had by then already been imprisoned in Russia for 6 months, was a Nazi as well.  For the 
Russian delegation to use the term genocide in the context of describing the violence towards 
the Russian-speaking minority in the south-east of Ukraine, is a large step away from their 
earlier insinuation that the West simply supported the toppling of Yanukovych and the start of 
a civil war and that the Ukrainian government was ignoring the right to self-determination in 
Crimea and Donbass. While the Council of Europe had already adopted resolutions in 2014 
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which called for Russia to stop ignoring the conventions it had signed for its accession and to 
respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, the Russian delegation again 
attempted to deny the blame and pointed its finger at the Ukrainian government for even 
worse actions, namely leaving aside all human rights and conducting mass killings on the 
“second-rate people”, the Russian-speaking minority in Donbass. Therefore, the Russian 
delegation not only denied any Russian involvement in Ukraine, but attempted to use the 
Council’s conventions to put the blame on other actors.  
 Besides all the accusations, there has been some support for Russian involvement in the 
conflict resolution. During the January 2015 session, there was one moment in which other 
delegations in the Council complimented the Russian delegation on Russia’s engagement with 
the refugees from Ukraine. According to the report which was discussed at the January session 
on the conflict in Ukraine, there already were 524,000 refugees from Ukraine on Russian 
territory and the Russian Federation had installed refugee camps, provided food and medicine 
and even invited a monitoring committee to prepare reports on the situation of these 
refugees.31 According to the rapporteur,  the Ukrainian government made some grave mistakes 
such as refraining to pay pensions and benefits to persons outside of government controlled 
areas and forbidding any movement of humanitarian organizations in the conflict areas.32  
The Russian delegation took these compliments as an opportunity to criticize Ukraine 
and the PACE even more for sanctioning Russia a year earlier. The strategy of the delegation 
was to prevent any new sanctions by expressing its sympathy to the Council of Europe and 
praise its importance as the main platform for dialogue in Europe: 
“The progress report shows that this year will be important for the Parliamentary Assembly of 
the Council of Europe. You are going to decide what the role of Parliamentary Assembly of the 
Council of Europe in the future architecture of Europe will be. Will it play an independent role, 
based on its own traditions, which have been formed in the 60 years of its history, or will it be 
governed by ideas that come from external political sources, and which distort the essence of 
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the co-operation between Strasbourg and Moscow and between the Parliamentary Assembly 
and the Russian delegation?  
(…) I call on the Ukrainian delegation to work with the Parliamentary Assembly, which is, after 
all, the broadest parliamentary set-up in our continent. We must try to solve political questions 
together. It is difficult, but we need to work together on humanitarian issues, which we will 
discuss tomorrow morning, and we must discuss the real situation on the ground.” 33 
 The first thing that stands out with this quote, is that when the Russian delegation 
addressed the potential resolution, the aggressive tone it used with respect to the accusations 
towards Russia now changed into a mild one, supportive of the Council of Europe. Even though 
the statement again denied the Council’s accusations towards Russian intervention in Ukraine, 
the delegation repeated that it was willing to continue a political dialogue. When reading 
between the lines, it becomes clear that by sharing with the rest of the Parliamentary Assembly 
that the Russian delegation believed that the PACE was able to decide on its own role in the 
“future architecture of Europe,” the Russians in essence warned the Parliamentary Assembly 
with the suspension of Russian cooperation. The statement clearly expressed that the PACE was 
able to decide whether the collaboration between the PACE and the Russian delegation, based 
on the Council’s traditions, would be respected as it was, or whether the PACE would continue 
with the sanctions and risk to lose Russian cooperation. The Russian delegation must have 
thought, based on the history of its relations with the PACE, that by threatening to suspend the 
cooperation, after suspending the contact with the PACE as a response to the latest sanctions, 
the PACE might give in and retreat from extending sanctions. Following this threat of 
suspending the cooperation with the Council, the Russian delegation very much exaggerated its 
willingness for political dialogue with the PACE: 
“The Russian Federation is a great power; it will not hold out its hands, begging for its 
credentials to be ratified. We want to participate in the most all-encompassing organisation of 
Europe, which is the Council of Europe, and in particular in its Parliamentary Assembly. Today 
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more than ever before, we must find a way that will either bring us closer together or divide us 
and send us in different directions, resulting in a split of Europe. I think we must stay together to 
build our common European house on the basis of the great Council of Europe values.” 34 
 This quote shows that the Russian delegation believed that the Council of Europe should 
not only accept Russia’s proposal of a dialogue, but that it moreover should be thankful for the 
delegation’s willingness to participate, since the Russian Federation “is a great power”, implying 
that it does not necessarily need the Council of Europe. The Russian delegation repeated the 
need for a political dialogue and its willingness to participate in such a dialogue on multiple 
occasions.35 Again, this appears to be a strategy with which the Russian delegation attempted 
to show the Council that the Russians identified with “great” values of the Council and 
especially identified with the other European member states, hoping to regain some trust.  
 As argued in chapter one, the idea of sanctioning an actor and thus placing it in the out-
group within a community eventually pushes for the actor’s internalization process in order for 
the sanctioned actor to become part of the in-group once again. However, this theory does not 
seem to apply to the Russian delegation in the Council of Europe. On top of its willingness to 
participate in political dialogue, the Russian delegation proposed several other concessions it 
was willing to take. First of all, the delegation proposed to present to the Russian authorities a 
request for permission for representatives of the PACE to visit Nadija Savchenko who again was 
supposed to be released when Minsk II was signed.36 But Savchenko was again not released 
until May 2016 during a prisoner swap with Ukraine (Luhn & Harding 2016). The Russian 
proposal to permit a Monitoring Committee to visit Crimea and at the same time write a report 
on the situation in Donbass  can be considered as a second concession.37 And finally, the 
Russian delegation requested the formation of a new working group that would be tasked with 
writing a new, unbiased report on the situation in Ukraine.38 Aside from these concessions, the 
Russian delegation though did not commit to any of the more important requests of the PACE, 
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such as, among others, to release political prisoners, retreat from Crimea, and stop with the 
shipment of weapons to the pro-Russian separatists. In reaction to the Russian delegation’s 
proposals, the United Kingdom’s delegation stated that:  
“For [the Russian delegation] to assert that Russia is not in breach of the Minsk agreements or 
protocols defies facts, unless you say that the signature of President Putin on the paper in 
relation to the agreements and protocols was forged and the documents are therefore 
worthless. I fear that what is happening is that, because the Minsk agreements do not suit the 
Russian Federation, it is trying to disown them. (…) [The Russian delegation] has to get real. The 
Russian Federation has the attitude that you can make agreements and then break them and 
deny you ever made them. (…) We need to realise that countries that have a record of making 
promises and agreements and then not complying with them should be treated with a lot of 
scepticism.”39 
 Due to its persistent denial of any activity in Ukraine, the Russian delegation started to 
lose its credibility in the PACE. Until now, with every proposal for political dialogue and Russia’s 
appreciation for the shared, traditional values that the Council of Europe is built on, it appeared 
as if the Russian delegation attempted to show some kind of, most probably acted, 
identification with the Council of Europe’s common lifeworld. This would mean that the Russian 
delegation could be classified as a Type I socialized state. Unfortunately, actions speak louder 
than words and, as explained in chapter one, there is a limit to an actor’s conscious roleplaying 
in Type I socialization. Namely, whenever an actor continuously clashes with the common 
lifeworld of the community he loses his credibility (Schimmelfennig 2000, 119). This is exactly 
what happened to the Russian delegation in the PACE. The Russians did not get the reaction 
they hoped for, as new resolutions were adopted by the PACE accusing the Russian Federation 
of intervening in Ukraine and not upholding any of the Council’s conventions concerning human 
rights and international law. According to one such resolution, Russia’s actions “brought into 
question the commitment of the Russian delegation to the principles and membership 
obligations of the Council of Europe” (PACE 2015c, Resolution 2034). The Russian delegation’s 
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response to the Parliamentary Assembly’s choice to question the delegation’s commitments 
was very clear, since no Russian delegates participated in any other Annual Session of 2015.  
 
4.3.2. The Parliamentary Assembly from April 2015 onwards 
The suspension of the voting rights of the Russian delegation did not work out the way the 
PACE hoped it would. Not only did the Russian delegation suspend its contacts with the PACE 
during 2015, but in 2016 and 2017 the Russian delegation even refused to transmit any 
credentials to the Parliamentary Assembly which means that not only did the delegation refuse 
to attend the sessions, but it refused to take part in the PACE’s activities for two consequent 
years (PACE a). Other delegations besides the Ukrainian delegation in the PACE repeatedly 
stated that they wanted the Russian delegation to return to the table in order to continue a 
constructive dialogue and be able to work towards a resolution for the conflict in Ukraine.40 
After the Russian delegation suspended its contacts, the Serbian delegation stated that the 
main role of the PACE members is to strengthen the PACE’s position in international relations, 
and that: 
“MPs of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Parliamentary 
Assembly have obviously understood that better than us, as they have not even discussed the 
suspension of the voting rights of the Russian delegation but have rather promoted dialogue. 
Today, they can boast of the results that they have achieved, which have enabled the OSCE 
further to strengthen its global position. We should ask ourselves what we have done and 
whether we have done anything to strengthen the position of the Council of Europe in any way. I 
am afraid that we have not.”41 
Clearly, some delegations in the PACE realized that their plan to push the Russian 
delegation towards internalization of the Council’s norms and values and adhere to their rules 
might have backfired. The French delegation agreed with the Serbian delegation’s statement 
                                                          
40 Appendix A, PACE AS 2014 CR 28;  PACE AS 2014 CR 29; PACE AS 2015 CR 02; PACE AS 2015 CR 03; PACE AS 2015 
CR 24, Addendum I.  
41 Appendix A, PACE AS 2015 CR 06. 
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and added that the PACE could have expected this reaction by the Russian delegation, which 
meant that the PACE had deliberately “deprived ourselves of the possibility of engaging in 
dialogue” with the Russian delegation in order to ensure a peaceful resolution in Ukraine and 
the implementation of the Minsk agreements.42 Even though the various delegation in the 
PACE have still not managed to pull the Russian delegation back into dialogue it is clear that at 
least part of the PACE would like to retreat from the sanctions since the Russians have shown 
that the sanctions are harming the relationship between Russia and the PACE.  
 
4.4. Conclusion 
The Russian delegation used a consistent rhetoric during the Annual Sessions of the Council’s 
Parliamentary Assembly in 2014 and 2015 that discussed the situation in Ukraine. The 
delegation was extremely steadfast in denying the Russian annexation and occupation of 
Crimea, the material support to the pro-Russian separatists in Donbass or any other 
involvement in the conflict in Ukraine. The delegation’s tone towards the PACE did change 
though and became more aggressive when the allegations towards the Russian Federation 
continued. 
 Whereas the delegation initially, during the January 2014 sessions, attempted to 
genuinely show its identification with the Council of Europe’s shared values and conventions, as 
well as its compassion towards the horrible protests in Kiev, their stance already had changed 
in April of the same year. Of course, during the January 2014 sessions the accusations towards 
Russia remained relatively mild. The PACE only blamed Russia for pressuring the Ukrainian 
government into signing the gas deal in order to serve Russian national interests. This made it 
possible for the Russian delegation to ignore accusations and simply express its willingness for 
peaceful change by respecting the Council’s shared values.  
During the April 2014 sessions though, the Russian Federation had already annexed 
Crimea and the PACE had subsequently started writing reports on the violations that the 
Russians had committed. Also, PACE set up sessions to discuss potential sanctions for the 
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Russian delegation, and some delegations even talked about dismissing Russia’s credentials. 
When the PACE gained this assertive attitude towards Russia and its delegation, the Russian 
delegation turned somewhat more aggressive and started accusing the United States and 
Europe of meddling in Ukrainian internal affairs. During these sessions though, the delegation 
remained relatively calm and reverted to the shared values that the members of the Council 
seemed to be forgetting. Here it seems that the Russian delegation at least is acting in 
accordance to Type I socialization.  
Further down the road, in 2015, the relations between the PACE and the Russian 
delegation had gravely deteriorated. The Russian delegation did not attend the PACE Summer 
or Fall Sessions of 2014 after the suspension of its voting rights during the Spring 2014 Session, 
and attended only one session in 2015. During this 2015 Winter Session, the delegation turned 
to a much more aggressive tone and strategy by accusing the United States and Europe of 
supporting Nazism and playing dirty little games in Ukraine in order to achieve their political 
agenda of containing Russia. On top of that, the Russian delegation repeatedly threatened that 
the cooperation or relations between the Council of Europe and the Russian Federation would 
worsen or even completely be dissolved if the PACE would take the wrong decision in terms of 
its sanctions of the Russian delegation. Even though the PACE decided not to dismiss the 
credentials of the Russian delegation, the delegation did suspend all contacts with the PACE 
once again. In conclusion, the Council’s strategy placing the Russian delegation in the outgroup 
in order to push it to internalize the common lifeworld of the Council pay off and did certainly 
not push for the socialization process of the Russian Federation. At the first glance, it appears 
that the Russian delegation’s degree of socialization can be placed under Type I socialization. 
However, due to its behavior and decreased credibility in the Council, it appears that the 
Russian Federation did not socialize at all and only internalized some of the values as a result of 
its involvement in the international system, but feels that it can ignore them whenever it wants 
to.  
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Chapter 5 
Analysis of Statements of the Russian Delegation in the OSCE 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter will analyze the statements made by the Russian delegation to the Permanent 
Council of the OSCE from 2014 onwards, which were aimed at discussing the conflict in Ukraine. 
Similar to the previous chapter, the analysis is focused on the assessment of the degree of 
internalization of the common lifeworld of the OSCE by the Russian delegation in the OSCE. 
Through this analysis it will be possible to conclude whether the socialization process of the 
Russian delegation can be classified as Type I or Type II socialization. Before conducting the 
analysis, it is necessary to keep in mind Russia’s role in the OSCE and the OSCE’s role in the 
conflict in Ukraine. Again, the Russian delegation will be treated as one actor with one degree 
of socialization, rather than as multiple individual representatives, due to the similarity in the 
rhetoric of the delegates. The Russian historical and geopolitical interests in Ukraine that have 
been set out in chapter three of course remain valid for the analysis of the statements of the 
Russian delegation in the OSCE as well.  
 The common lifeworld of the OSCE is relatively similar to the common lifeworld of the 
Council of Europe. The OSCE is mostly formed around the Helsinki Final Act, which is, as stated 
in chapter two, the basis for the OSCE’s security community as a forum for non-violent issue 
resolution. On top of the security aspect of the OSCE, the organization, through the Helsinki 
Final Act among others, also emphasizes the humanitarian aspect of issues and attempts to 
work towards resolutions which encompass the human aspect of conflicts. Comparable to the 
Council of Europe, the OSCE’s common lifeworld is thus based on the respect and protection of 
human rights such as the freedom of speech, freedom of press, freedom of movement, being 
free from torture, and democratic principles such as the right to self-determination and the 
right to free and fair elections and territorial integrity. The OSCE, like the Council of Europe, 
legitimizes the Russian Federation in the international political arena, which could very well be 
considered as the benefit that the OSCE has to offer in exchange for Russia’s socialization 
  S1627511 
66 
 
process and adherence to the common lifeworld and rules that have been set up collectively by 
the OSCE participant states. 
 The Russian Federation has had less troubling relations with the OSCE since the 
beginning of the conflict in Ukraine than it has with the Council of Europe. Before the conflict in 
Ukraine though, during the Russian intervention in Georgia for example, Russia had expressed 
its disappointment in the OSCE’s conflict resolution. The ODHIR’s support for the Orange 
Revolution in Ukraine offended the Russian leadership as well, and Russia consequently lost its 
support for the OSCE and accused the OSCE of having an east of Vienna bias (Galbreath 2009, 
161). Nevertheless, Russia turned to the OSCE for conflict resolution when the conflict in 
Ukraine erupted. As stated in chapter four, some delegations in the PACE have even expressed 
their regrets of the PACE’s sanctions on the Russian delegation and argued that the OSCE has 
done a better job at maintaining an open dialogue with the Russians. The Russian delegation 
requested monitoring missions on two checkpoints of the Russian-Ukrainian border and joined 
the peace talks within the Trilateral Contact Group which is undeniably a very different attitude 
than the Russian delegation in the Council of Europe has shown, which could very well mean 
that the Russian delegation’s socialization process might be categorized differently than in the 
Council of Europe.  
 
5.2 Analysis of the statements by the Russian delegation to the OSCE’s Permanent Council 
In order to find the statements by the Russian delegation that could be analyzed to decide on 
the degree of socialization of the Russian delegation, I have first searched for the OSCEPA’s 
sessions which were dedicated to the conflict in Ukraine since the setup of these sessions 
would resemble the PACE’s sessions the most and thus the statements have been made in a 
similar context. As there are no verbatim records of these sessions or sessions of the other 
OSCE bodies, the only primary source available for analysis of the OSCEPA in this specific time 
period is a speech by the Russian speaker of the Duma,  Sergey Naryshkin to the OSCEPA. In 
order to be able to have statements of the Russian delegation which have been made in a 
comparable setting as the ones in the Council of Europe, I have only analyzed the statements of 
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the Russian delegation to the OSCE’s Permanent Council. The press statements from the 
Trilateral Contact Group are thus not being analyzed here, since the setup of these meetings is 
much more exclusive and the statements are not made in reaction to other participant states’ 
statements on the conflict in Ukraine, but are joint statements from the participants of the 
Trilateral Contact Group or from its Special Representative. Because the Permanent Council 
meets once a week and there are thus many statements available for analysis, I have only 
collected statements on the conflict in Ukraine, the OSCE’s missions in Ukraine and the Minsk 
agreements. Since the rhetoric and tone of the statements of the Russian delegation to the 
Permanent Council of the OSCE remain very much consistent throughout the sessions on the 
conflict in Ukraine between 2014 and 2016, this chapter will cover a variety of topics that come 
forward instead of treating the sessions chronologically.  
 One important event to keep in the back of our minds when analyzing these statements, 
is that even though the Russian delegation did not suffer from any sanctions from the OSCE, the 
whole Russian delegation did miss the OSCEPA session in July 2015 in Helsinki, because of travel 
restrictions that were part of Finland’s sanctions on Russia. In a protest against these travel 
restrictions that affected a number of Russian delegates to the OSCE, Sergey Naryshkin 
announced that the Russian delegation as a whole was not going to be present at the OSCEPA 
Helsinki Session (Russia Today 2015). Surprisingly, as happened in the Council of Europe after 
the PACE’s sanctions, the Russian delegation does not state anything in the statements to the 
Permanent Council of the OSCE on the Finnish sanctions and thus its absence during the 
Helsinki Sessions. This shows that the Russian delegation to the OSCE definitely takes on a 
different attitude than the Russian delegation to the Council of Europe.  
 
5.2.1 The Russian delegation to the OSCE’s Permanent Council on accusations towards Russia 
Similar to the Russian delegation in the PACE, the Russian delegation in the OSCE denies any 
accusations towards Russia in terms of its role in the conflict in Ukraine. During his address to 
the Annual Session of the OSCEPA in July of 2015, the Speaker of the Russian state Duma, 
Naryshkin stated that: 
  S1627511 
68 
 
“One can only undermine the peace process in Ukraine, which is still very fragile by trying yet 
once again (and without any justification!) to put the blame on Russia for all calamities.”43 
In the Permanent Council of the OSCE, the Russian delegation has steadfastly argued 
that the accusations towards Russia, which are being resonated in the Western media and the 
Council of Europe, such as the illegal annexation and occupation of Crimea and the support of 
pro-Russian separatists in the east of Ukraine with weapons and men, are nothing but empty 
accusations and lies.44 According to the Russian delegation, the accusations are an emotional 
rhetoric, based on biased information that is fed to the world by the media and thus is not 
based on any evidence.45 The Russian delegation lends support to this claim by arguing that in 
the reports from the OSCE’s Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) in the border region for 
example, no evidence is found for the popular accusations towards Russia, and simply requests 
the Permanent Council to “keep to the facts.”46  As already becomes clear in Naryshkin’s 
statement, he attempts to change the rhetoric of the other participating states that blame 
Russia since it is not justified, and specifically underlines the fact that it does not help move the 
peace process forward. The Russian delegation echoes this argumentation, when already in 
May of 2014, only two months after the annexation of Crimea, the delegation stated that: 
“The continuing lie as regards Russia’s violation of OSCE commitments on the territory of 
Ukraine and the statements about the alleged aggression are clearly intended as provocation. 
They do not contribute to a consolidation of the efforts of the international community (…) to 
help stabilize the situation in Ukraine and are instead undermining them.”47 
 
 Also, the Russian delegation in the OSCE’s Permanent Council, similar to the Russian 
delegation’s rhetoric in the PACE, argues that the accusations are fabricated by the United 
States, and are very much applauded by NATO and Ukraine, in order to justify violence in the 
                                                          
43 Appendix B, Sergey Naryshkin. “Address at the 23-rd Annual Session of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly.” 
(speech, Baku, June 28, 2014). 
44 Appendix B, OSCE Permanent Council PC.DEL/535/14; OSCE Permanent Council PC.DEL/560/14; OSCE Permanent 
Council PC.DEL/595/14; OSCE Permanent Council PC.DEL/116/15; OSCE Permanent Council PC.DEL/379/14; OSCE 
Permanent Council PC.DEL/1346/14. 
45 Appendix B, OSCE Permanent Council PC.DEL/361/14.    
46 Appendix B, OSCE Permanent Council PC.DEL/361/14; OSCE Permanent Council PC.DEL/1366/15.    
47 Appendix B, OSCE Permanent Council PC.DEL/535/14. 
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east of Ukraine. The delegations asks the Permanent Council to accept the Russian point of 
view as well, besides the American point of view and explains that it is the United States’ 
“propaganda” which states that Kiev is supposedly trying to handle the “Russian threat” which 
defends, unjustly, Kiev’s investments in the army and operations of the Ukrainian armed 
forces.48 Even though the Russian delegation here again denies any violations of the OSCE 
commitments, the delegation maintains a calm and professional tone, and appears open to 
finding solutions for the conflict.  
 According to the Russian delegation, the accusations towards Russia are not the only 
thing  harming the peace process. In addition to this warning, the delegation reminds the other 
participating states that the Russian Federation is one of the only states that “is making a real, 
practical contribution to defusing the crisis.”49  This suggests that the Russians call for a change 
not only in the rhetoric of the other participating states, but in their actions as well. The Russian 
delegation, when denying the accusations of any illegal actions and the breaching of 
international law, lays the blame of the conflict on several actors, starting with the United 
States, which of course is the culprit in the Russian official view. As Washington has 
irresponsibly supported the “violent seizure of power” in Kiev, it paved the way for the rise of 
nationalism in Ukraine.50 Again, according to the same rhetoric as in the Council of Europe, the 
Russian delegation to the OSCE’s Permanent Council argues that one of the largest issues and 
dangers of the conflict in Ukraine is  ultra-nationalism that is being supported in Kiev. This ultra-
nationalism eventually leads to even more worrying ideologies according to the Russian 
delegation, since “the policy of the Kyiv regime is leading to rampant neo-Nazism, 
manifestations of anti-Semitism and xenophobia.”51 People supporting these ideologies are the 
people who commit violence against the pro-Russian separatists in Crimea and Donbass and 
these people are the core reason for the pro-Russian  results of the referenda in Donetsk and 
Luhansk.52 Although in the Council of Europe the Russian delegation calls upon the 
international community to sanction the ones (predominantly the United States) that are 
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supporting this ultra-nationalism, in the OSCE the delegation only states that the ultra-
nationalism is the root cause of the separation of Crimea and Donbass from Ukraine. The 
Russian delegation does not mention any form of sanctions during any of the statements and 
uses less harsh terms to describe its point of view on the events in Ukraine. 
 In response to the accusation that the Russian Federation has illegally annexed and 
occupied Crimea, the Russian delegation argues that the separation of Crimea from Ukraine is 
the result of these ultra-nationalist sentiments in Kiev and states that there is nothing illegal 
about the annexation, but that on the contrary: 
 
“After February’s unconstitutional transfer of power in Kyiv – in fact, a State coup – the 
residents of Crimea made use of a unique opportunity to realize their right to self-determination 
as enshrined in Article 1 of the Charter of the United Nations. This right is (…) [among others] 
also one of the fundamental principles of the Helsinki Final Act of 1975.  
(…) Creating a sovereign and independent State, the freedom to accede to an 
independent State or unite with it (which is what happened when Crimea and Sevastopol 
became part of Russia), or establishing any other political status freely chosen by the people – 
these are all ways of enacting the right to self-determination. It is defined as such in the 1970 
Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation 
among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.”53  
The Russian delegation asks for the other participating states to respect the choice that 
the people of Crimea have made and clarifies to the Permanent Council that the unification is in 
accordance with international laws, and that the international community should accept that 
fact.54 On top of that, the Russian delegation argues that it is impossible for the Russians to 
undermine territorial integrity in Crimea with its military presence there, because Crimea is 
legally integrated into the Russian Federation, and thus it is simply military presence on its own 
territory.55 As already becomes clear when analyzing the statements in reaction to the 
accusations towards Russia, is that the Russian delegation attempts to justify all Russian actions 
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in Ukraine. It does so by constructing arguments which incorporate the international laws that 
they themselves are being accused of breaching. What becomes evident from these 
statements, is that the Russian delegation has learned what the common lifeworld of the OSCE 
consists of. It does not become clear yet though whether they have internalized it and thus 
have socialized or whether their socialization process can be classified as Type I socialization. 
 
5.2.2 The Russian delegation to the OSCE’s Permanent Council on the OSCE’s norms and values 
The Russian delegation does not only call upon the OSCE’s participating states to respect the 
right to self-determination of the Crimean people and the peoples in the regions of Luhansk 
and Donetsk. It repeats the argument that others should not forget to respect the OSCE’s 
norms and values which are comprised in the Helsinki Final Act in other ways as well. 
 First of all, the Russian delegation, as the delegation in the PACE, accuses the leadership 
in Kiev of violating the Minsk agreements and states that by breaching these agreements, Kiev 
is also attempting to “pull out of the Helsinki Final Act”, because of the many human rights 
violations that are happening in Donbass due to the Ukrainian militaries actions, such as 
keeping prisoners illegally and torture, but also the restriction of movement into the conflict 
areas in terms of humanitarian aid and the financial issues due to the non-payment of pensions 
in the rebel-controlled areas.56 Because the leadership in Kiev is not talking to the newly 
elected leaders in Luhansk and Donetsk, the Ukrainian government is, according to the Russian 
delegation, “openly hampering” the peace process as has been set out in the Minsk 
agreements, in which it has been agreed upon to organize peace talks together with the 
leadership of Luhansk and Donetsk.57 On top of that, the Ukrainian government is deliberately 
delaying the implementation of the Minsk agreements, because there is a lack of internal 
constitutional reform from Kiev’s side, which is part of the Measures Package as well.58 Again, 
the Russian delegation uses the norms, values, and especially the rules that are set out in the 
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Helsinki Final Act to accuse Ukraine of breaching the Minsk agreements and does so without 
emphasizing the argument of neo-Nazism as is done by the Russian delegation in the PACE.  
The Russian delegation often calls for the OSCE to push the Ukrainian government for 
the implementation of the Minsk agreements:  
“We call on our colleagues to stop taking up the cry that the implementation of the Package of 
Measures depends exclusively on Russia. Firstly, this is a lie; secondly, it gives Ukraine a reason 
to drag out the implementation of the Minsk agreements even further. (…) It is worth 
emphasizing once again that there is no alternative to the implementation of the Minsk Package 
of Measures if we are to achieve a lasting settlement of the Ukrainian crisis. Obviously, work 
must also continue on its implementation next year. We trust that our Western colleagues will 
be able to exert the necessary influence on Ukraine to achieve real progress to that end.”59 
 The call for the Western states to push Kiev to implement the Minsk agreements is 
repeated in other statements as well.60 According to the Russian delegation, it is primarily the 
Ukrainian government that violates the Minsk agreements, of course as stated before, due to 
its unwillingness in organizing peace talks together with the leaders of the Luhansk and the 
Donetsk People’s Republics. The Russian delegation states that this “stubborn unwillingness” is 
a way for Kiev to get out of a joint resolution, which is one of the main points of the Minsk 
agreements.61 According to the Russian delegation, the Kiev leadership is in fact doing 
“everything possible to delay the implementation” of the Minsk agreements, “particularly its 
political part.”62 Similar to its rhetoric in the Council of Europe, the Russian delegation 
emphasizes that specifically direct political dialogue, is the only option to come to a peaceful 
resolution.63  
 Another violation of fundamental freedoms that the Russian delegation accuses the 
Ukrainian government of, which did not come forward in the Council of Europe, is the freedom 
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of speech and specifically the violation of the Convention on the Freedom of Media that has 
been signed by the participating states of the OSCE. According to the Russian delegation, not 
only the civilians living in the conflict areas are being victimized due to the actions of the 
Ukrainian military forces, but journalists and other reporters such as the OSCE observers are 
the victims of these violations as well: 
“As for the situation of journalists in Ukraine, it is indeed complicated. We note a range of 
flagrant violations of commitments regarding freedom of the media. There are no special 
measures to ensure the freedom of Russian journalists, including protection against arbitrary 
deportation. 
(…) We welcome the recent signing of a memorandum between Russian and Ukrainian 
journalist associations under the auspices of the Office of the OSCE Representative on Freedom 
of the Media. (…) We call on the senior officials of the OSCE and the Representative on Freedom 
of the Media to use their authority to secure the detained journalists’ immediate release.”64  
While in the Western media, the abduction of the OSCE observers and several 
journalists in the conflict area in Donbass have been covered as kidnappings by the pro-Russian 
separatists, the Russian delegation does not react in any way to the accusations that because 
the Russians are supposedly supporting these separatists, the Russian state might be partly 
responsible for these kidnappings (Rainsford 2014; Harding 2014). The Russian delegation 
though does condemn the kidnappings multiple times and calls upon securing the freedom of 
the kidnapped journalists. Also, because the SMM reports mentions the “violations by Ukraine 
of the freedom of movement of OSCE monitors” such as stopping SMM vehicles and blocking 
them from crossing the border into the conflict area, again, the Ukrainian government is 
purposefully violating the agreements in order to stall the ceasefire and internal constitutional 
reforms.65 
Clearly, even though the Russian delegation contradicts all the accusations and reports 
in the Council of Europe and the accusations of the OSCE’s participating states of its actions in 
                                                          
64  Appendix B, OSCE Permanent Council PC.DEL/560/14. 
65  Appendix B, OSCE Permanent Council PC.DEL/1421/15. 
  S1627511 
74 
 
Ukraine, the tone that the Russian delegation uses in the OSCE remains calm and professional 
during these statements. The delegation even calls for diplomatic correct behavior, when 
discussing the behavior of other delegations in the OSCE:  
“I should like to draw the attention of the representatives to the ill-mannered and actually 
offensive language directed at the Russian leadership by the Permanent Representative of the 
United States of America in his statement. Such language is incompatible both with the ethical 
norms of diplomatic relations and with the unwritten rules regarding statements in the 
Permanent Council. Evidently, the Permanent Representative of the United States of America is 
unfamiliar with them. I find that his statement tends to kindle antagonism. This is not what 
diplomats should be doing. I think it would not be fitting for me to respond in the same tone.”66 
 During another session, the Russian delegation had already commented on the United 
States’ Permanent Representative for its offensive language when he called the Russian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs “Absurdistan” because it views Crimea as Russian territory, and 
called this language “tabloid language” which is not fit for the OSCE.67 This shows that the 
Russian delegation at least says it values the norms of diplomatic relations and the rules of 
conduct in the Permanent Council, suggesting that the Russian delegation seeks professional 
relations and dialogue, based on the norms and values of the OSCE. This could mean that the 
Russian delegation has internalized the norms and values of the OSCE and thus its socialization 
could be classified as Type II socialization, instead of Type I.  
  
5.2.3 The Russian delegation to the OSCE’s Permanent Council on the OSCE’s work in Ukraine 
The Russian delegation is very steadfast in declaring that the OSCE should play an extremely 
important role in the resolution of the conflict in Ukraine. In his address to the OSCEPA, Sergey 
Naryshkin clarifies what he, and thus the Russian delegation, believes the OSCE’s role in the 
conflict resolution should be: 
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“I suppose that under these circumstances the OSCE will reaffirm its overarching mission and 
will take an effective action in the name of security and equitable cooperation on the continent.  
 (…) Let me remind you that among the 10 principles of the Helsinki Final Act - in addition 
to the item on the inviolability of frontiers - there are other, and no less important items, 
including the one regarding the priority of peaceful settlement of any disputes and the one 
regarding the right of peoples to decide their own destiny, which is expressly enshrined in the 
United Nations Charter.”68 
The Russian delegation echoes the idea that the conflict in Ukraine gives the OSCE the 
opportunity to solidify its role as security and cooperation organization in Europe.69 This could 
suggest two things. On the one hand, it is possible that the Russian delegation truly advocates 
the OSCE’s role in the international community, but on the other hand, it might also be the case 
that the Russian delegation would like to strengthen the OSCE’s role in the security and 
cooperation in Europe in order to secure its own political agenda. The Russian delegation 
repeats over and over in its statements how much it appreciates and supports the OSCE’s work 
through its monitoring missions and the Trilateral Contact Group, and even states that the 
OSCE’s missions cause the OSCE to be “the largest international presence in Ukraine and a very 
important stabilizing influence.”70  
“The OSCE has done a great deal to de-escalate the Ukrainian crisis. This has been possible 
thanks to its unique features as a forum for inclusive dialogue on the basis of equal rights. It is 
capable, thanks to the consensus rule, of adopting genuinely collective decisions that are in the 
interests of all participating States.”71 
In emphasizing the Russian support for the OSCE’s work, the Russian delegation does 
also repeatedly suggest that especially the work of the SSM will have to show the OSCE’s 
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impartiality in the conflict and thus, when reading between the lines, it suggests that the OSCE 
will have to accept the Russian point of view on the conflict.72 The Russian delegation mostly 
encourages the reports of the observers in the missions, since they mention the absence of 
Russian military in Donbass and criticize the Ukrainian government for a lack of reform. 
However, when a report by the ODIHR suggested that the Russian state is (in part) responsible 
for the humanitarian crisis in Ukraine, the Russian delegation’s reaction changed: 
“Let me say a few words about the report of the Human Rights Assessment Mission to Ukraine. 
Unfortunately, there can be no talk of this document objectively reflecting the human rights 
situation in Ukraine. … All things considered, we believe that with this work the ODIHR has done 
great harm to its reputation. It has demonstrated political bias and prejudice. Worse still, when 
the people mentioned in the report become aware of its content not only will the image of the 
ODIHR suffer but also that of OSCE as a whole.”73  
 This means that the Russian delegation uses the fact that it has lost its trust in the 
objectivity in the OSCE in the past, in order to push for the acceptance of the Russian point of 
view. This becomes evident when taking a look at the delegation’s reactions to the mission’s 
reports. When the ODIHR’s report accuses the Russians of the violation of human rights in 
Donbass, the Russian delegation accuses the OSCE of being biased and argues that this bias will 
undermine the image of the OSCE as an impartial player in the international arena. With this 
argumentation, the Russian delegation shows its defensive attitude in terms of its role in the 
conflict and its participation in the OSCE. In addition, the Russian delegation kindly reminds the 
Permanent Council of Russia’s role in the missions: 
“I might recall that the invitation to host an OSCE border monitoring operation was a goodwill 
gesture on the part of Russia. It was made in the wake of the Berlin declaration of 2 July 2014. 
Without waiting for a ceasefire to be established in neighbouring Ukraine, Russia deployed OSCE 
                                                          
72 Appendix B, OSCE Permanent Council PC.DEL/361/14; OSCE Permanent Council PC/DEL/379/14; OSCE 
Permanent Council PC.DEL/230/15.  
73 Appendix B, OSCE Permanent Council PC.DEL/535/14.  
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observers at the Russian checkpoints of Donetsk and Gukovo to dispel concerns regarding 
security at the border.”74  
 The Russian delegation’s reminder to the Permanent Council that the invitation by the 
Russians was “a gesture of goodwill” is repeated several times throughout the delegation’s 
statements, and the delegation even adds that “[Russia does] not have any obligations to 
deploy observers along the entire length of the border.”75 Implying, that if the OSCE’s reports 
are not objective in the eyes of the Russian delegation, the Russian goodwill might disappear 
and that the missions would become less easy to carry out. Even though the Russian delegation 
with these statements in a way threatens the OSCE’s missions, the delegation does not state 
that it will retreat, and maintains a friendly, yet strict tone. This implies that the Russian 
delegation still attempts to show its willingness in finding a resolution for the conflict in Ukraine 
and its identification with the norms and values of the OSCE, again pointing towards Type II 
socialization.  
 
5.3 Conclusion 
The Russian delegation used a much more consistent rhetoric during the weekly sessions of the 
OSCE’s Permanent Council than in the PACE between 2014 and 2016 regarding the conflict in 
Ukraine. Even though the Russian delegation remained very steadfast in denying the Russian 
annexation and illegal occupation of Crimea and the Russian support of the pro-Russian 
separatists in Donetsk and Luhansk, the Russian delegation remained calm and used 
professional language in denying these accusations. When the PACE suspended the Russian 
delegation’s voting rights, the Russian delegation in the OSCE did not change its attitude. And 
even when several delegates were unable to attend the OSCEPA Helsinki Session in July 2015 
and the Russian delegation protested by not attending at all, the Russian delegation refrained 
from expressing its dissatisfaction with EU sanctions by striking an aggressive tone.  
                                                          
74 Appendix B, OSCE Permanent Council PC.DEL/1150/14.  
75 Appendix B, OSCE Permanent Council PC.DEL/345/16; OSCE Permanent Council PC.DEL/1666/16. 
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 In the statements throughout the first two years of the conflict, the Russian delegation 
appears to show that it has internalized the common lifeworld of the OSCE, by emphasizing its 
discontent with the various human rights and international laws that are being violated in the 
conflict areas, especially by the Ukrainian government and its military forces. On top of that, 
the Russian delegation attempts to justify Russian involvement in Ukraine by constructing 
arguments that incorporate the international laws that they are being accused of violating. As 
stated before, this does definitely show that the Russian delegation at least has learned what 
the OSCE’s common lifeworld is and that for example the territorial integrity, freedom of 
speech and the right to self-determination are part of this common lifeworld. Whether the 
Russian delegation identifies itself with this common lifeworld is not yet clear by these 
statements though and it could still very well mean that the Russian delegation’s socialization 
process in the OSCE can be classified as Type I socialization and not Type II socialization. 
 When the Russian delegation talks about the professionality of the other delegations, 
especially the United States’ delegates, it appears that the Russian delegation is specifically 
keen on keeping the discussions professional and reminds the other participating states of the 
norms and values of the diplomatic discourse. This suggests that the Russian delegation seeks, 
on the contrary of the choice of language by the Russian delegation in the Council of Europe, 
professional relations and dialogue. This would be an argument for the actual internalization of 
the common lifeworld of the OSCE, and thus point towards Type II socialization instead of Type 
I socialization.  
 The same goes for the statements on the OSCE’s role and its missions in the conflict in 
Ukraine. The Russian delegation praises the OSCE’s work repeatedly and is willing to support 
the missions financially and on the ground. Again, pointing towards the Russian willingness to 
come to a peaceful resolution for the conflict and the Russian delegation’s possible 
internalization of the OSCE’s common lifeworld. However, even though the Russian delegation 
stresses its appreciation and support for the OSCE’s missions, the delegation has from the 
beginning emphasized that it is because of Russia’s goodwill that the OSCE has the opportunity 
to conduct its monitoring missions and that these missions are a great opportunity for the OSCE 
to prove that it does not have an ‘east of Vienna bias’. With these statements, the Russian 
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delegation, although while remaining calm, warns the OSCE that without respect for the 
Russian point of view, the execution of the various monitoring missions might become 
complicated due to the withdrawal of Russian support. The Russian delegation never actually 
states that it might withdraw its support, but when reading between the lines it becomes clear 
that the delegation does in a subtle way warn for this possibility. 
 The assessment of the degree of socialization in the OSCE of the Russian delegation is 
more difficult than for the Council of Europe, simply because the Russian delegation acts more 
in accordance with the norms and values of the OSCE within the sessions. But because the 
Russian state does violate international laws which it should abide to according to the common 
lifeworld of the OSCE, the Russian delegation can in any way not be assessed as Type II 
socialized. More probably the Russian delegation to the OSCE has learned what the common 
lifeworld of the OSCE exists of, and attempts to show its living by these norms and values but 
has not actually internalized them, thus concluding that the Russian delegation in the OSCE can 
be assessed as being a Type I socialized state.  
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Conclusion 
 
This thesis has analyzed whether the depiction of Russia’s obstinate attitude towards 
international agreements, which is formed due to Russian President Putin’s statements, is 
correct, or whether Russia appears to be less obstinate than it has been depicted by Ukraine 
and the West in handling the conflict in Ukraine, when working within an international 
organization. This has been done by answering the following question: Have the Russian 
delegations to the Council of Europe and the OSCE been socialized and have they thus 
internalized the norms and values of these organizations into their self-identification? 
 The hypothesis of this thesis was that the Russian delegations have not truly internalized 
the common lifeworlds of neither the Council of Europe, nor the OSCE, but that they engage in 
so-called conscious role play. This would mean that the Russian delegations have learned what 
the common lifeworlds of these organizations consist of and act in accordance with these 
lifeworlds in order to gain international legitimacy. This would place the Russian delegations 
under Type I socialization. The idea was that if the Russian delegations in the OSCE and the 
Council of Europe appeared to be very much socialized, then despite the obstinate statements 
and negation of involvement in the conflict by President Putin in public, Russian delegations in 
international organizations do attempt to work towards fair resolutions and wish to uphold 
human rights and international laws. Russia should then not be depicted as a state that does 
not care about international agreements. On the other hand, if the Russian delegations did not 
appear to have internalized the shared norms and values of both organizations, then it might be 
correct to depict Russia as an obstinate player in international politics.   
In the Russian delegation’s statements to the OSCE’s Permanent Council and the 
Council’s Parliamentary Assembly it has become very clear that the Russians deny any negative 
involvement in the conflict. By constructing theories that put the blame for the conflict on the 
United States and the EU, the Russian delegations in both organizations hope to turn the tables 
around and get the international community to recognize the annexation of Crimea as a legal 
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incorporation into the Russian Federation, and to recognize the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s 
Republics.  
 From the analysis it seems that the Russian delegation in the Council of Europe has not 
internalized any of the common lifeworld in its self-identification, except for possibly the 
internalization of some norms and values as a result of involvement in the international 
community. By turning to aggressive and offensive strategies when the PACE sanctioned the 
Russian delegation, denying accusations, pushing forward its theory of prevailing Nazism and 
genocide in Ukraine and changing the topic from conflict resolution to deteriorating relations 
between Russia and Europe, the Russian delegation appears not to be bothered with its 
credibility in the Council of Europe. Also, while using the common lifeworld of the Council to 
put the blame on others, the Russian delegation appears to forget the public statements of 
their president and do not mention the protection of minority rights at all. It even seems that 
the Russian delegation feels that it has enough leverage on the PACE to continue its violations 
in Ukraine and simultaneously claim its benefits, namely legitimacy, from the Council of Europe. 
Clearly the Russian delegation’s degree of socialization cannot be classified as Type II 
socialization, but even Type I socialization does not seem to be the proper classification in the 
Council of Europe.  
 The Russian delegation in the OSCE on the other hand appears to have internalized at 
least parts of the common lifeworld of the OSCE. The Russian delegation here is more friendly, 
politically correct and does not revert to aggressive accusations towards other participant 
states. The arguments which put the blame on the United States and Ukraine for the conflict 
seem more carefully constructed and the Russian delegation, does not become more 
aggravated when the accusations towards Russia continue. On the contrary, the Russian 
delegation continuously praises the OSCE’s work in the conflict and even asks for more 
missions. The only way the Russian delegation appears to steer the OSCE towards the Russian 
agenda is by emphasizing that the conflict in Ukraine is the perfect opportunity for the OSCE to 
work on its reputation in the international arena and get rid of the OSCE’s negative perception 
(in Russia) of being western biased. Even though the Russian delegation’s behavior in the OSCE 
appears to show a degree of socialization that can be placed under Type II socialization, the 
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Russian state does violate international laws with its intervention in Ukraine. This is why the 
Russian delegation in principle cannot be classified as Type II socialized, but at best can be 
argued to be considered a Type I socialized state. This means that the Russian delegation might 
in part identify itself with the common lifeworld of the OSCE, but mostly acts in accordance to 
them due to the logic of consequences, and its wish to gain legitimacy in the international 
community.  
 At the beginning of this thesis it appeared interesting to see the differences between 
the OSCE and the Council of Europe due to the time length of Russia’s participation or 
membership in these organizations. However, after conducting the analysis it appears that the 
time period of being a part of the organizations does not matter, even though the Russian 
degree of socialization in the OSCE appears to be further than in the Council of Europe. More 
so, it seems that the role the organization can play in Russia’s political agenda and its national 
interests are more important for the socialization process. Since the Council of Europe is known 
to retreat from its sanctions, the Russian delegation has more leverage and thus might not feel 
the need to actually internalize or act in accordance with the common lifeworld of the Council, 
since it knows it can get away with it. On the other hand, the OSCE does not sanction the 
Russian delegation due to its non-compliance, but this takes away Russia’s leverage in the 
OSCE, which eventually leads to internalization, or at least conscious role playing, granting the 
OSCE its role as an important organization for the conflict resolution in Ukraine, and Russia its 
legitimacy. 
 Unfortunately it is not possible to decide on a definite degree of socialization of the 
Russian delegations by only looking at the statements of the Russian delegations to these 
organizations. Further research into this topic might be to take this analysis and interview the 
delegates as individuals in order to assess whether they identify or not with the common 
lifeworld of the Council of Europe and the OSCE. It has become clear though that the resolution 
to the conflict in Ukraine will remain hard to find as long as the international organizations do 
not accept the Russian point of view on the conflict.  
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